Nudging robots: Innovative solutions to regulate artificial intelligence by Guihot, Michael et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Guihot, Michael, Matthew, Anne F., & Suzor, Nicolas P.
(2017)
Nudging robots: Innovative solutions to regulate artificial intelligence.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law. (In Press)
This file was downloaded from: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/109926/
c© Copyright 2017 Vanderbilt Law School
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence 
Michael Guihot,† Anne F. Matthew‡ and Nicolas P. Suzor* 
 
There is a pervading sense of unease that artificially intelligent 
machines will soon radically alter our lives in ways that are still 
unknown. Advances in AI technology are developing at an extremely 
rapid rate as computational power continues to grow exponentially. 
Even if existential concerns about AI do not materialise, there are 
enough concrete examples of problems associated with current 
applications of artificial intelligence to warrant concern about the 
level of control that exists over developments in AI. Some form of 
regulation is likely necessary to protect society from risks of harm. 
However, advances in regulatory capacity have not kept pace with 
developments in new technologies including AI. This is partly because 
regulation has become decentered; that is, the traditional role of 
public regulators such as governments commanding regulation has 
been dissipated and other participants including those from within the 
industry have taken the lead. Other contributing factors are the 
dwindling of resources in governments on the one hand and the 
increased power of technology companies on the other. These factors 
have left the field of AI development relatively unregulated. Whatever 
the reason, it is now more difficult for traditional public regulatory 
bodies to control the development of AI. In the vacuum, industry 
participants have begun to self-regulate by promoting soft law options 
such as codes of practice and standards. We argue that, despite the 
reduced authority of public regulatory agencies, the risks associated 
with runaway AI require regulators to begin to participate in what is 
largely an unregulated field. In an environment where resources are 
scarce, governments or public regulators must develop new ways of 
regulating. This paper proposes solutions to regulating the 
development of AI ex ante. We suggest a two-step process: first, 
governments can set expectations and send signals to influence 
participants in AI development. We adopt the term nudging to refer to 
this type of influencing. Second, public regulators must participate in 
and interact with the relevant industries. By doing this, they can 
gather information and knowledge about the industries, begin to 
assess risks and then be in a position to regulate those areas that pose 
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most risk first. To conduct a proper risk analysis, regulators must 
have sufficient knowledge and understanding about the target of 
regulation to be able to classify various risk categories. We have 
proposed an initial classification based on the literature that can help 
to direct pressing issues for further research and a deeper 
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When Google purchased DeepMind in 2014, its owners made it a condition of 
the sale that Google establish an ethics board to govern the future use of the 
artificial intelligence technology.4 This insistence betrayed concerns about AI 
development from within the industry. Google apparently agreed to set up the 
ethics board, but nothing is known about who the members of the board are or of 
the content of any discussions that the board might have had. On 20 July 2016, 
Google reported that it had deployed DeepMind’s machine learning in a series of 
tests on one of its live data centres. The tests resulted in a reported 40% decrease in 
energy consumption for the centre while the AI was applied.5 Google reported that 
‘working at Google scale gives us the opportunity to learn how to apply our 
research to truly global and complex problems, to validate the impact we can have 
on systems that have already been highly optimised by brilliant computer scientists, 
and - as our data centre work shows - to achieve amazing real-world impact too’.6 
Working at ‘Google scale’ presumably means using Google’s worldwide 
infrastructure to test its AI systems – the opportunities for which appear to be 
limitless. Google has already expanded its testing using DeepMind in other areas 
such as to reduce global warming,7 and to improve diagnosis and treatment in 
healthcare.8 If the results of the application of AI in Google’s data centres can be 
replicated more broadly so as to reduce the world’s energy consumption, avert 
global warming, or enable affordable, accessible health care, then humanity will 
reap great benefits.9 However, while the results of the tests appear laudable, some 
questions linger such as what checks and balances were in place to govern the 
application of AI here? Were any risks of its application considered and 
ameliorated in the tests? What governance is in place to control companies testing 
beta versions of AI applications on a large scale? Conversely, if regulation is put in 
place prematurely or without proper thought and consultation, would the potential 
benefits that might result from the general application of these programs in other 
areas be retarded or lost? In short, would regulation have a chilling effect on 
innovation that is harmful for the long-term public interest? We argue that, with 
                                                     
4 Alex Hern, Whatever happened to the DeepMind AI ethics board Google promised?, 
THE GUARDIAN, January 27, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/26/google-deepmind-ai-ethics-board 
(last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
5 Google, DEEPMIND AI REDUCES GOOGLE DATA CENTRE COOLING BILL BY 40% 
DEEPMIND (2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-ai-reduces-google-data-centre-
cooling-bill-40/ (last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
6 Google, DEEPMIND COLLABORATIONS WITH GOOGLE DEEPMIND (2016), 
https://deepmind.com/applied/deepmind-for-google/ (last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
7 Sam Shead, DEEPMIND IS FUNDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH AT CAMBRIDGE AS IT 
LOOKS TO USE AI TO SLOW DOWN GLOBAL WARMING BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA (2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/deepmind-is-funding-climate-change-research-at-
cambridge-university-2017-6 (last visited Jul 26, 2017). 
8 DeepMind, WORKING WITH THE NHS TO BUILD LIFE SAVING TECHNOLOGY DEEPMIND, 
https://deepmind.com/ (last visited Mar 19, 2017). 
9 Here, we have concentrated on the work of Google but it is only one of the major 
innovators in this area. Similar work on developing AI is also being carried out by 
Facebook, Microsoft and Apple, to name a few – see the discussion in Part II below. 
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these questions in mind, AI should be more actively regulated because the benefits 
that can be achieved through controlled or regulated application outweigh the 
potential negative impacts of regulating. This paper addresses these and some of 
the many other issues that must be addressed by potential regulators when seeking 
to regulate new technologies such as AI. 
In Part II, we outline the range of threats posed by different applications of AI 
and introduce the case for regulating its development. While some argue that 
developing AI poses an existential threat to humanity, others point to the benefits 
attained by relatively controlled development and application of more benign 
systems. We argue that these arguments are at cross purposes and distract from a 
more pressing need: government ought not only play a part in guiding the 
development of AI for the broader benefit of humankind, but must also regulate to 
address the very real and present problems associated with current applications of 
AI today. These include bias and safety concerns as well as the pressing effect on 
employment and the inherent intrusion into our privacy caused by AI interrogating 
the data we generate as part of our everyday lives. Before we contemplate 
regulating AI though, we must more precisely define and classify the different 
technologies that are often referred to as AI. This classification exercise, we argue, 
is vital to understanding the different types of risks that regulation might seek to 
address. This spectrum of risks posed by different classes of AI provides the basis 
upon which we ultimately argue for a stratified approach to regulation. This is 
developed further in Part V. 
In Part III, we set out the challenges of regulating AI. The pace of innovation 
in AI has far outstripped the pace of innovation in regulatory tools that might be 
used to govern it. This is often referred to as the pacing problem of regulation.10 In 
these situations, regulation lags behind or in some circumstances ‘decouples’ from 
the technology it seeks to address.11 Another core challenge regulatory agencies 
face lies in the difficulty in understanding the social impacts of AI on a systems 
level, and engaging with these impacts at every (or any) stage of development.12 A 
‘social systems analysis’ will allow regulators to understand the operation of AI in 
a broad social context.13 As the DeepMind example illustrates, the reasons why 
particular decisions involving the ways in which AI is developed and applied are 
made can be opaque, largely incomprehensible,14 and sometimes even 
                                                     
10 See THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL 
OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM, (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby, & Joseph R. 
Herkert eds., 2011); Braden R. Allenby, Governance and Technology Systems: The 
Challenge of Emerging Technologies,  in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 3–18 (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. 
Allenby, & Joseph R. Herkert eds., 2011); Kenneth W Abbott, Introduction: The 
Challenges of Oversight for Emerging Technologies,  in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE 
MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 1–16 (Kenneth W Abbott, Gary E. Marchant, & 
Braden R. Allenby eds., 2014). 
11 Braden R. Allenby, The Dynamics of Emerging Technology Systems,  in INNOVATIVE 
GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES , 43 (Kenneth W Abbott, Gary E. 
Marchant, & Braden R. Allenby eds., 2013). 
12 Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There is a blind spot in AI research, 538 NATURE 311–
313 (2016). 
13 Id. 
14 Perri 6, Ethics, regulation and the new artificial intelligence, part II: autonomy and 
liability, 4 INF COMMUN SOC 406–434, 410 (2001). 
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unknowable.15 Research and development in AI is carried out in many different 
locations, at different times, and in ways that are not highly visible. The scale of 
research also varies and can be carried out by a single person on a home computer 
or at a scale that only large multinational companies such as Google can attain. 
There is no shortage of advice given to regulators about how to respond to 
technological change. We review the challenges that current and future 
developments in AI are likely to pose for regulators, and the different and 
sometimes conflicting advice that commentators have urged regulators to follow. 
We consider the urgency of developing effective mechanisms of regulation, and 
explain how the challenges of regulating AI are different in kind to challenges of 
regulating in other domains. We argue that as many public regulators now find 
themselves without the resources to adequately understand or intervene in the 
range of complex issues that rapid developments in AI present, some regulatory 
innovation is required. In order to meet these challenges, we suggest that regulators 
will need to be adaptable, develop new strategies to learn about risks, and identify 
opportunities to influence technological developers. We show that recent 
developments in how regulation is conceived go some way to identifying potential 
future strategies for public regulators, but that more work is needed. 
In Part IV, we consider how public regulators such as governments face an 
unprecedented challenge in managing complex governance systems that include 
not only public regulatory agencies but also individuals, firms, market competitors, 
and civil society organisations that all might play some role in influencing the 
development of AI in different contexts. While the regulation of other emerging 
technologies is not directly applicable to AI, there is much that can be learned from 
innovations in regulation in other fields.16 Current regulatory mechanisms, 
including laws governing tort, copyright, privacy, and patent, and regulations that 
govern other emerging technologies are either unsuitable or, for other reasons, 
cannot easily be applied to novel technological developments in areas such as the 
regulation of AI.17 The challenge in regulating this field is magnified by the 
fundamental uncertainty about how AI will develop and how that development 
may impact on the other challenges we will face in the future.18 
The effect of the size and power of the multinational companies that develop 
most of the applications of AI in the world, such as Google, Facebook and 
Microsoft, raises fundamental issues about the ability of governments to regulate in 
this area at all. Far fewer of the traditional tools of regulation once available to 
governments seeking to regulate AI remain viable or available. We highlight the 
concerns being expressed about the rampant research and development into AI by 
                                                     
15 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
16 Roger Brownsword, So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on Regulating 
Technologies,  in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 23–48, 30 (Roger Brownsword & Karen 
Yeung eds., 2008). 
17 Allenby, supra note 11 at 20–21. 
18 Gonenc Gurkaynak, Ilay Yilmaz & Gunes Haksever, Stifling artificial intelligence: 
Human perils,  COMPUT. LAW SECUR. REV., 754–5 (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364916300814 (last visited Nov 2, 
2016). 
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some of the world’s biggest companies, ostensibly ungoverned,19 and propose some 
innovative solutions to counterbalance the power disparity. We review the range of 
proposals and suggestions for regulating AI, and consider how regulatory theory 
provides guidance.  
In Part V we argue that in the context of highly constrained governance 
resources, some regulatory innovation is required. Some regulation theorists are 
experimenting with different interventions in choice architecture to set the context 
and environment in which choices are made so as to promote regulatory goals.20 
We argue that there is a role for government to play in shaping the regulatory 
environment at a very broad policy level by nudging or influencing beneficial 
development.21 By using its influence in this way, government can seek to guide 
the development of AI by framing the agenda in positive ways without wholly 
relinquishing its traditional regulatory role. This will also allow governments to 
develop a fuller regulatory response over time. The multitude of different 
applications of AI would make it improbable that nudging would have an effect at 
the micro level of individual applications. At this micro level, we suggest that other 
more concrete regulatory approaches need to be employed. For a government to 
influence the development of AI systems and successfully further the public 
interest, it must be able to understand and influence this complex and intricate web 
of actors that often have diverse goals, intentions, purposes, norms and powers.22 
When the focus shifts to regulation within individual industries or of particular 
types of AI applications, regulatory agencies must move beyond nudging and adopt 
more focussed, nuanced and adaptive approaches to regulation.23 Other theorists 
have proposed greater roles for regulatory agencies with specific expertise.24 Still 
others have suggested that public regulators may be able to experiment with more 
                                                     
19 This issue was raised in an article in Nature by Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo and 
was referred to as the ‘blind spot in thinking about AI’. See Crawford and Calo, supra note 
12 at 311.  
20 Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Behavioural Sciences and the Regulation of 
Privacy on the Internet,  in NUDGING AND THE LAW-WHAT CAN EU LAW LEARN FROM 
BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES (Alberto Alemanno & Lise Sibony eds., 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513771 (last visited Nov 4, 2016). 
21 Other versions of adaptive policymaking to address deep uncertainty have been 
proposed using various models or approaches to policymaking. See for example the various 
adaptive approaches set out in Warren E Walker, Vincent AWJ Marchau & Darren 
Swanson, Addressing Deep Uncertainty Using Adaptive Policies, 77 TECHNOL. FORECAST. 
SOC. CHANGE 917–923 (2010); Warren E Walker, Adnan S Rahman & Jonathan Cave, 
Adaptive Policies, Policy Analysis, and Policy-Making, 128 EUR. J. OPER. RES. 282–289 
(2001).  
22 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURR. LEG. PROBL. 103–146, 105 (2001). 
23 See Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent 
Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMMUN. LAW J. 483, 487 (2008). for 
example who proposed applying his version of ‘adaptive policymaking’, where regulators 
‘tinker’ with ‘inputs, connectivity, incentives, and feedback’ to encourage firms to act in 
ways that further the public good. 
24 Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J. LAW TECHNOL. 354–400 (2016). 
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rapid, temporary laws,25 although the potential lack of legal certainty that results 
may create further problems for investors and other participants in the field. We 
identify some of these opportunities for innovation in the work of public regulators. 
A regulatory intervention in the development of AI technology must consider 
the spectrum of risks that different AI applications pose. In Part V, we introduce a 
risk-based regulation framework to help regulators work through the different 
forms of AI and to identify where scarce regulatory resources should be 
concentrated. Our initial typology presents three discrete categories: low, medium 
and high risk applications of AI. Of these, we suggest that the most productive area 
for regulators to focus on at the moment is medium to high risk categories but that 
the potential for low risk AI to quickly develop into high risk should mean that 
these areas must not be completely discounted.  
In Part VI we conclude with a suggestion for greater cooperation and 
information sharing between regulators and the potentially regulated. We argue 
that, with the increase in societal concerns about the risk inherent in developing AI, 
regulation of AI is an inevitable and responsible approach to governance. 
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
To be able to regulate AI, regulatory bodies must understand both the thing 
that they seek to regulate and the potential risks that it poses. We must cast our 
gaze both back and into the future to see how AI has been defined and what it 
might become, and what risks AI has posed and might pose in the future. We 
outline some attempts that have been made to define AI and see that there is no 
concrete definition. This has led to an informal classification system based upon 
the ‘strength’ of the underlying algorithm or its ultimate effect. Traditional 
classifications of AI differentiate between ‘narrow’ and ‘strong’ AI. This is 
unsatisfactory in terms of defining AI because one measures breadth while the 
other measures strength. We propose a different classification; one based upon the 
risks that each AI application poses. In this way, we can begin to sort various 
classes of AI based on whether the AI poses a low, medium, or high risk to either 
society or to human safety or wellbeing. This classification is crucial to 
understanding how regulatory strategies can be tailored to the relevant AI risk 
profile. Regulatory bodies need to perform this risk analysis before they develop 
laws that affect a class of AI. It is important then to distinguish the various 
meanings given to the term ‘artificial intelligence’ and the different forms AI may 
take. This allows us to identify a subset or range of applications of AI most suitable 
for governments or regulatory bodies to initially regulate. 
A. Defining AI 
Before defining artificial intelligence we need first to define intelligence. 
Intelligence in human terms has been described as a set of factors that include 
                                                     
25 Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation,  in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, 
BUSINESS AND INNOVATION (M Fenwick et al. eds., 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2831040 (last visited Nov 2, 2016); S. RANCHORDÁS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (2015). 
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‘consciousness, self-awareness, language use, the ability to learn, the ability to 
abstract, the ability to adapt, and the ability to reason’.26 Once intelligence is 
defined, estimations or approximations of those qualities should form the 
benchmark of attempts to create or simulate it – hence artificial intelligence. But a 
simulation of which of those characteristics of intelligence can be called artificial 
intelligence? Must it replicate all aspects of intelligence? John McCarthy did not 
limit intelligence in AI to a replication of human intelligence but argued that 
machines could display other intelligences that involve ‘much more computing 
than people can do’.27 He defined artificial intelligence as ‘the science and 
engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer 
programs.’28 Omohundro adopted an external agency requirement and defined AI 
as a system that ‘has goals which it tries to accomplish by acting in the world’.29 
Russell and Norvig summarised eight definitions of AI differentiated by how they 
reflected expectations of human thinking and behavior or (machine) rational 
thinking and behavior.30 Ultimately, Russell and Norvig preferred the rational agent 
approach in which machine agents ‘operate autonomously, perceive their 
environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and 
pursue [the best expected outcome]’.31 To be able to display these characteristics, 
AI also needs to be actuated in machinery, whether that is a computer system or a 
robot. Typically, though, these machine behaviors have been compared against 
human abilities to process language, to reason, and to perceive and manipulate 
objects in the environment to attain pre-determined goals.32 
All of these definitions set a fairly high bar for an algorithm to attain before it 
meets the definition of AI. AI then can be differentiated from machine learning 
systems or even machine learning that learns from examining large data sets, 
                                                     
26 Scherer, supra note 24 at 360. Consciousness on its own has proved notoriously 
difficult to define, a difficulty amplified when attempting to define artificial consciousness. 
See Christof Koch et al., Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems, 17 
NAT. REV. NEUROSCI. 307–321 (2016); GERALD M EDELMAN, THE REMEMBERED PRESENT: 
A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2000); Francis Crick & Christof Koch, 
Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness, 2  in SEMINARS IN THE 
NEUROSCIENCES 263–275 (1990), http://authors.library.caltech.edu/40352/ (last visited Jul 
17, 2017); Francis Crick & J. Clark, The astonishing hypothesis, 1 J. CONSCIOUS. STUD. 
10–16 (1994); Stanislas Dehaene & Jean-Pierre Changeux, Experimental and Theoretical 
Approaches to Conscious Processing, 70 NEURON 200–227 (2011); Steve Torrance, Ethics 
and consciousness in artificial agents, 22 AI SOC. 495–521 (2008); Wendell Wallach, Colin 
Allen & Stan Franklin, Consciousness and ethics: artificially conscious moral agents, 03 
INT. J. MACH. CONSCIOUS. 177–192 (2011); Paul FMJ Verschure, Synthetic consciousness: 
the distributed adaptive control perspective, 371 PHIL TRANS R SOC B 20150448 (2016). 
27 John McCarthy, WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? (2007), http://www-
formal.stanford.edu/jmc/whatisai/ (last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
28 Id.  
29 Stephen M. Omohundro, The Basic AI Drives,  in ARTIFICIAL GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE 2008 483–493 (Pei Wang, Ben Goertzel, & Stan Franklin eds., 2008). 
30 STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH (3rd ed ed. 2016). 
31 McCarthy, supra note 27 at 4–5. This combination of perception, adaptability, 
creativity and autonomous operation reflects what would be required of an agent to pass the 
Turing test. 
32 RUSSELL AND NORVIG, supra note 30 at 2–3. 
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sometimes using neural networks to make deep connections among the data. If 
these computations do not display the other characteristics of AI such as operating 
autonomously, adapting to change, creating and pursuing their own goals,33 then 
they cannot be AI. However, while they cannot be AI based on the definitions 
above, machine learning systems are also, perhaps erroneously, often referred to as 
being AI. 
The lack of definitional clarity means that the broad label, AI, has become the 
vernacular term for a range of programs, algorithms and networks that are used in a 
multitude of applications. For example AI is used to refer to the programs 
underlying chess and other game playing programs and Roomba vacuum 
cleaners,34 but also to the coordinated systems controlling autonomous vehicles and 
the personal agents developed by Microsoft, Apple and Google among others. 
Some of these uses of the term AI are differentiated by using descriptors such as 
‘narrow AI’ to distinguish their limited application to a single set task. When AI is 
developed so as to apply more broadly or with greater effectiveness it is often 
referred to as becoming stronger,35 rather than the opposite of narrow: broader. 
Complicating this definitional problem further, research by mathematicians 
and engineers who seek to develop self-replicating and self-aware algorithms is 
said also to be work ‘in AI’.36 There has been some attempt to distinguish this work 
from narrow or even stronger AI and algorithms that display these characteristics 
by referring to it as ‘strong AI’. A more common reference is artificial general 
intelligence (AGI). As opposed to narrow AI, AGI is said to possess ‘a reasonable 
degree of self-understanding and autonomous self-control, [has] the ability to solve 
a variety of complex problems in a variety of contexts, and [can] learn to solve new 
problems that they didn’t know about at the time of their creation’.37 AGI is 
‘subject to a variety of “drives” including self-protection, resource acquisition, 
replication, goal preservation, efficiency, and self-improvement’.38 It is generally 
recognised that AGI does not yet exist but it is AGI that causes most concern to 
those who believe that AI creates an existential threat to humanity. We discuss this 
further in Part II C. 
                                                     
33 Liza Daly, AI LITERACY: THE BASICS OF MACHINE LEARNING WORLD WRITABLE 
(2017), https://worldwritable.com/ai-literacy-the-basics-of-machine-learning-2e20f93e34b4 
(last visited Apr 13, 2017). 
34 These single task applications are often classified as narrow AI - see ARTIFICIAL 
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, VI (Ben Goertzel & Cassio Pennachin eds., 2007). See also RAY 
KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR 264 (2010). The bulk of AI research and 
development today is conducted into this narrow type of AI – see ARTIFICIAL GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE, supra note at 1. 
35 KURZWEIL, supra note 34 at 289 and 409. This classification system refers to narrow 
AI as opposed to strong AI. Perhaps a clearer dichotomy would be to refer to weak AI and 
strong AI but we retain the traditional classification in this paper. 
36 Laurent Orseau, Asymptotic non-learnability of universal agents with computable 
horizon functions, 473 THEOR. COMPUT. SCI. 149–156 (2013). 
37 ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 34 at VI. 
38 Steve Omohundro, Rational Artificial Intelligence for the Greater Good,  in 
SINGULARITY HYPOTHESES: A SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 161–179 
(Amnon H Eden et al. eds., 2012). 
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The range of applications of AI sits on a spectrum from those applications that 
are not strictly AI,39 through to narrow applications of AI (as found in chess games 
etc) to AGI. When referring to AI then, we must bear in mind this vast array of 
uses and misuses of the term. It is neither possible nor even desirable to govern all 
of these diverse uses of AI using one regulatory approach. However, the risks 
associated with these different applications of AI will arguably drive different 
regulatory responses and must therefore be treated differently. This is why we 
argue for a classification based on the risk that various AI applications pose. For 
public regulators that have limited resources and information, classifying AI can 
inform their decisions about which applications or class of AI to regulate first, and 
at what level. 
B. Introducing risk as a defining point 
We propose that risk should be considered as a quality that differentiates 
classes of AI. We develop this idea further in Part III but here we argue that once 
applications of AI are classified according to the potential risk each poses to 
society or to the people or environment in which they are applied, then public 
regulators can more efficiently and effectively direct their regulatory responses. 
Without that knowledge, they will be grasping in the dark at even understanding 
the regulatory problem.40 
Even categorising risk in relation to AI is complicated by a lack of clarity on 
AI’s potential. On one hand, underpinning the risk analysis is the pervasive fear 
that AI will develop rapidly to the point at which it will annihilate humans as a 
species either through some miscalculation in replicating software or because 
humans are suboptimal to the machine’s set goals. When talking about risk in 
relation to AI, it is these risks that linger just below the surface of each argument. 
On the other hand, others argue that the development of AI is benign and beneficial 
to society. However, these arguments may be at cross-purposes due, we argue, to a 
lack of a sufficient and agreed-upon definition for AI. We suggest that classifying 
AI based upon potential risk factors as suggested in this paper may clarify some of 
these arguments so that regulation may be used where required to minimise risks, 
while at the same time allowing development of less risky AI with only minimal 
                                                     
39 See for example Adi Prakash, “DOING AI”: WHAT LEGAL SHOULD REMEMBER ABOUT 




mpaign=buffer&_almReferrer=https:%2F%2Ft.co%2Fwki9DruH9A (last visited Jul 27, 
2017). 
40 The United States government has recognised this. See recommendation 5 in its 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL 
COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
(2016) which states “Agencies should draw on appropriate technical expertise at the senior 
level when setting regulatory policy for AI-enabled products. Effective regulation of AI-
enabled products requires collaboration between agency leadership, staff knowledgeable 
about the existing regulatory framework and regulatory practices generally, and technical 
experts with knowledge of AI. Agency leadership should take steps to recruit the necessary 
technical talent, or identify it in existing agency staff, and should ensure that there are 
sufficient technical ‘seats at the table’ in regulatory policy discussions”. 
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regulatory intervention. In this way, we can avoid suggesting the same regulatory 
response to the AI in a Roomba, for example, as we would to regulate autonomous 
weapons systems or the comparatively simple algorithms that regulate critical 
environmental or energy systems. 
In Part II C, we discuss the arguments made in relation to the existential risks 
posed by some in relation to AI. As discussed, these arguments are often raised as 
reasons to regulate the development of AI and must be addressed. Then in Part II 
D, we outline concrete examples of problems associated with current applications 
of AI in use today that, we argue, also require a regulatory response but for more 
concrete reasons. 
C. Reports of the Singularity and the End of Humanity May be 
Greatly Exaggerated 
Perhaps the most visceral fear about the development of AI is the existential 
threat to humanity that is said will be caused by the rise of super-intelligent 
machines.41 These concerns pervade the collective conscious in relation to AI. We 
argue that this fear may be overstated given the current state of development in AI 
but it is such a pervading idea that it informs every level of discussion. It is also 
addressed in every code of conduct, standard, or values statement that has been 
developed by those in the industry42 and should be addressed in any regulatory 
intervention. 
In 1965 Good proposed that society would be transformed by the invention of 
a machine with ultra-intelligence. It would surpass human intelligence and be able 
to design even more intelligent machines.43 It would, he argued, be the last machine 
that humans would ever need to make for themselves44 and would save humanity.45 
Good argued that this ex machina in human image would be designed from an 
understanding of human intellect.46 Good’s optimism was not shared by subsequent 
scholars such as Vinge, who saw super-intelligent machines not as saviours but as 
the advent of doomsday. Vinge’s concern was that once the machine attained 
human level intelligence, it would not remain at that level for long and would reach 
superintelligence and beyond very quickly. Vinge argued that such a machine 
                                                     
41 See for example, Vernor Vinge, The coming technological singularity: how to survive 
in the post-human era,  in VISION 21: INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN 
THE ERA OF CYBERSPACE 11–22 (1993), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19940022855 
(last visited Mar 14, 2017); Writing 15 years after Vinge, Kurzweil appears most optimistic 
about the outcome of the singularity but maintains an element of caution. See KURZWEIL, 
supra note 34; NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (First 
edition ed. 2014); Nick Bostrom, When machines outsmart humans, 35 FUTURES 759–764 
(2003); JOHN VON NEUMANN & RAY KURZWEIL, THE COMPUTER & THE BRAIN (2012). 
42 See the discussion of these soft law approaches in Part IV B 2 below. 
43 Irving John Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6  in 
ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 31–88, 33 (Franz L. Alt and Morris Rubinoff ed., 1966), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180 (last visited Mar 14, 
2017). 
44 Id. at 31–32. 
45 Id. at 31. 
46 Id. at 78. 
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could become aware of its own superior intelligence. This event, which he 
described as the singularity, would spell the end of humanity.47 
These fears are not new and are not confined to fears of AI. Age-old concerns 
in human mythology about humans playing god-the-creator form the basis of 
stories such as the Frankenstein and golem stories. These stories have parallels 
with, and lessons for, the development of AGI. In the myth, a golem is created, 
often from clay, and imbued with life through ‘a detailed statement of specific 
letter combinations that are required to bring about the “birth” of a golem’48 — 
comparable to the algorithm in AI. In some golem stories, the golem obtains 
superhuman strength and, uncontrolled, causes destruction and mayhem. The 
parallels to the creation of AGI with super human intelligence are apt. A further 
parallel might be drawn with the desire to regulate or control these fears. For 
example, golems were bound by Jewish law. They were programmed not to kill 
unless necessary and could not lie.49 We see here the birth of the idea of embedding 
legal codes within technical code.50 
Existential concerns have stimulated the minds of ethicists and philosophers 
since soon after work began on AI.51 However, discussions about the legal 
ramifications of AI were typically slower to develop and early considerations of AI 
and the law only appear in the early 1980s.52 Even then, the dangers associated with 
the inability to understand and control AI were apparent.53 This problem has not 
diminished and, if anything, has probably increased in the nearly 40 years since 
1981. Researchers in AI recognise that there is a potential risk that if autonomous 
AGI is developed, it will be difficult for a human operator to maintain control.54 
Some of the risks seem remote, or are, at this stage, only potential problems, 
but stories that portray the catastrophic consequences of autonomous, self-aware 
AI such as those portrayed in science fiction, as well as the prophecies of 
researchers such as Omohundro pervade the zeitgeist and have begun to induce a 
level of anxiety and fear that may well yet reach a tipping point in society’s 
consciousness.55 People can be particularly risk averse when they stand to lose 
something,56 and governments respond to the desires and concerns of the societies 
                                                     
47 Vernor Vinge, The coming technological singularity: how to survive in the post-
human era, in VISION 21: INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN THE ERA OF 
CYBERSPACE 11–22, 33 (1993), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19940022855 (last 
visited Mar 14, 2017). 
48 STORYTELLING: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYTHOLOGY AND FOLKLORE, 204 (Josepha 
Sherman ed., 2008).  
49 Id. at 205. 
50 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2nd edition ed. 2006). 
51 See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS (2nd ed. 1961). 
52 See Sam N Lehman-Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of 
Artificial Intelligence, 13 FUTURES 442–457 (1981).  
53 Id. at 446. citing; WIENER, supra note 51. 
54 See Omohundro, supra note 38. 
55 Malcolm Gladwell identified the three characteristics that identify what he described 
as a tipping point, particularly in epidemics, as ‘one, contagiousness; two, the fact that little 
causes can have big effects; and three, that change happens not gradually but at one 
dramatic moment’, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS 
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 9 (2000).  
56 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263–292, 279 (1979).  
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they govern. One aim of the law is to predict what might go wrong and to design 
laws to prevent or avoid it. 
It is characteristic of exponential growth that all of the significant effects of 
the growth occur in the last short timeframe at the end of the growth set. AI has had 
a long gestation period. There have been many failed predictions about the 
imminent explosion of AI over the last sixty years, but, far from dissipating, the 
questions about AI’s impact will only become more urgent as we draw nearer to 
the exponential inflection point and its growth takes a sudden and dramatic vertical 
trajectory. The question is are we, after sixty years of growth, now approaching 
that inflection point or are we still in the slower gradual development phase? The 
answer must be that as we approach the point where AI begins to develop more 
quickly, we should begin to prepare for and guide the development of AI in ways 
that will benefit society while still avoiding existential threats as best we can. This 
should be the role of the law, but lawmaking processes are often criticised as being 
overly responsive or reactive rather than sufficiently proactive. 
Those within the AI industry have already taken steps to counter the concerns 
about AGI autonomously self-replicating out of human control. For example, 
Orseau and Armstrong, an engineer at DeepMind and a researcher into systemic 
risk respectively, acknowledged that ‘reinforcement learning agents … are unlikely 
to behave optimally all the time’.57 They recognised ‘concerns that a 
“superintelligent” agent may resist being shut down, because this would lead to a 
decrease of its expected reward’,58 and detailed how DeepMind’s engineers have 
developed a ‘big red button’, or an off switch for such an artificially intelligent 
reinforcement learning agent. Any regulation of AI might consider compulsory 
adoption of this program in all research and development into AGI. 
However, not everyone shares these concerns. The panel that contributed to 
the Stanford Report into AI titled Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030 noted that: 
Contrary to the more fantastic predictions for AI in the popular press, the 
Study Panel found no cause for concern that AI is an imminent threat to 
humankind. No machines with self-sustaining long-term goals and intent 
have been developed, nor are they likely to be developed in the near future. 
Instead, increasingly useful applications of AI, with potentially profound 
positive impacts on our society and economy are likely to emerge between 
now and 2030.59 
While threats to humankind posed by AI may yet still be some way off, it is 
important to listen to those in the industry who are calling for controls to be put in 
place now to prepare for the future. If AI ever does develop to a point where it 
becomes a threat to humanity, they argue, it may well be too late to do anything 
about it. Far from ignoring these fears and threats, any regulatory response to AI 
must address the risks they pose in some manner. The more recent warnings of 
technology entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and scientists like Stephen Hawking 
about the risks of runaway AI should at least cause regulators to pause and consider 
                                                     
57 Laurent Orseau & Stuart Armstrong, Safely Interruptible Agents,  in UNCERTAINTY IN 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 32ND CONFERENCE (2016). 
58 Id. at 2. 
59 PETER STONE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 4 (2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report (last visited Mar 14, 2017). (Stanford Report). 
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whether they have appropriate risk identification and mitigation strategies in 
place.60 
The call to regulate comes not only from the deep human fears of the 
singularity but also because of the more concrete problems associated with the 
narrow AI that currently exists, has already been implemented, and pervades our 
everyday lives. In Part II D, we analyse some of these unforeseen problems that are 
occurring now in current applications of AI. These issues highlight the potential for 
unforeseen errors to occur. These types of demonstrable errors and unforeseen 
problems are the canary in the coalmine of AI development. They provide warning 
about how things can go wrong when society and governments allow AI systems to 
be developed and deployed without appropriate regulation in place. Any regulatory 
response needs to ensure that AI systems are designed and deployed so that they do 
not pose any harm (in its broadest sense) to people or society.61 
D. Problems Associated With Current Applications of AI 
For the moment, the dystopian ramifications of rampant, uncontrollable AI 
are still the imaginings of science fiction writers.62 The current challenge for 
regulating AI is the proliferation in the capabilities of relatively narrow AI systems 
tasked with performing specific functions.63 Developments in AI technology have 
been smouldering since research on it began shortly after World War II.64 Today, 
AI is at the forefront of technological development and is used in driverless 
vehicles, speech and facial recognition, language translation, lip-reading, 
combatting spam and online payment fraud, detecting cancer, law enforcement, 
logistics planning, and language translation. Much of this AI is what can be 
described as narrow AI, that is, AI designed to solve a specific problem or familiar 
task, such as to play chess. These commercial applications of AI appear to be 
limitless and the world’s largest technology companies are investing heavily in its 
potential. For example, IBM’s cognitive computing platform, Watson, has 
developed from its initial challenge of winning the gameshow Jeopardy to being 
                                                     
60 See e.g. AI Open Letter, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE, https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-
letter/ (last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
61 Crawford and Calo refer to this as the blind spot in AI research. See Crawford and 
Calo, supra note 12. 
62 See for example, Will Knight, AI’s Future Is Not So Scary, 119 TECHNOLOGY 
REVIEW; CAMBRIDGE, 2016, at 17. As Knight puts it, at 17, “we can stop fretting that it’s 
going to destroy the world like Skynet.” 
63 KURZWEIL, supra note 37 at 459, where Kurzweil explains that there is an expectation 
that narrow AI will perform the task better or faster than human intelligence given the AI’s 
capacity to manage and consider vast arrays of data and variables; See also Ben Goertzel, 
Human-level artificial general intelligence and the possibility of a technological 
singularity, 171 ARTIF. INTELL. 1161–1173, 1162 (2007). Goertzel notes that the 
distinguishing features of narrow AI are that it does not understand itself, the task, nor how 
to generalize or apply the knowledge it has learnt in performing the task beyond the specific 
problem. For example, a narrow AI program for diagnosing one type of cancer would not 
itself be able to generalize its diagnostic insights to diagnose another type of cancer, though 
a human might be able to further develop the first AI for the subsequent purpose. 
64 McCarthy, supra note 27. 
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applied to provide real solutions to problems in commerce, law, and health.65 
DeepMind’s AlphaGo recently defeated the human master of the complex Chinese 
board game Go and Google also used DeepMind’s AI to reduce the electricity 
consumption in Google’s data centres;66 Microsoft has incorporated AI into its 
personal agents such as Cortana and Zo which can perform a dizzying array of 
tasks and answer seemingly unlimited questions using a mellifluous (female by 
design) computer generated voice;67 Microsoft’s algorithm, DeeperCoder, is 
capable of writing code to solve simple problems;68 Facebook uses AI in its face 
recognition, language translation, and camera effects and its research arm, 
Facebook Artificial Intelligence Research (FAIR) is said to be ‘committed to 
advancing the field of machine intelligence’.69 Joaquin Candela, Director of 
Engineering for Facebook’s Applied Machine Learning (AML) group has stated 
                                                     
65 IBM describes Watson as “the world’s first and most-advanced AI platform”: 
Cognitive Computing - IBM Research, , http://research.ibm.com/cognitive-computing/ (last 
visited Mar 11, 2017); See also IBM WATSON, IBM WATSON: HOW IT WORKS (2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Xcmh1LQB9I (last visited Mar 11, 2017); Video: 
IBM insiders break down Watson’s Jeopardy! win, TED BLOG (2011), 
http://blog.ted.com/experts-and-ibm-insiders-break-down-watsons-jeopardy-win/ (last 
visited Mar 11, 2017); IBM, IBM WATSON: A SYSTEM DESIGNED FOR ANSWERS (2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cU-AhmQ363I (last visited Mar 11, 2017); STEPHEN 
BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: MAN VS. MACHINE AND THE QUEST TO KNOW EVERYTHING 
(2011); Jessica S Allain, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implications 
of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. LAW REV. 1049–1070 
(2012); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of 
Patent Law, 57 BCL REV 1079, 1088–1091 (2016); Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy: 
Could IBM’s Watson Beat Courts at Their Own Game, 121 YALE LJF 87 (2011); IBM is 
currently tasking Watson with learning how to help with the identification of melanoma, 
and is seeking peoples input to assist with timely, accurate detection. See IBM, IBM 
COGNITIVE - OUTTHINK MELANOMA - AUSTRALIA, https://www.ibm.com/cognitive/au-
en/melanoma/ (last visited Mar 11, 2017); Commercial applications of Watson include, for 
example, ROSS Intelligence’s software marketed to lawyers as “your own personal 
artificially intelligent researcher … that can effortlessly find the answer to any legal 
question”; ROSS can be asked questions in natural language, just as you would “any other 
lawyer”. See ROSS INTELLIGENCE, MEET ROSS, YOUR BRAND NEW ARTIFICIALLY 
INTELLIGENT LAWYER 0.32-0.36 seconds (2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZF0J_Q0AK0E (last visited Mar 10, 2017); Mark 
Gediman, Artificial Intelligence: Not Just Sci-Fi Anymore, 21 AALL SPECTR. 34–37, 35–
36; Paul Lippe, What We Know and Need to Know About Watson, Esq., 67 SCL REV 419 
(2015). 
66 See this and other examples of DeepMind’s application in the introduction to this 
paper. 
67 Microsoft, MICROSOFT’S AI VISION, ROOTED IN RESEARCH, CONVERSATIONS NEWS 
CENTRE, https://news.microsoft.com/features/microsofts-ai-vision-rooted-in-research-
conversations/ (last visited Mar 13, 2017). 
68 Dave Gershgorn, MICROSOFT’S AI IS LEARNING TO WRITE CODE BY ITSELF, NOT STEAL 
IT QUARTZ, https://qz.com/920468/artificial-intelligence-created-by-microsoft-and-
university-of-cambridge-is-learning-to-write-code-by-itself-not-steal-it/ (last visited Mar 
20, 2017). 
69 Facebook, FACEBOOK AI RESEARCH (FAIR) FACEBOOK RESEARCH, 
https://research.fb.com/category/facebook-ai-research-fair (last visited Mar 14, 2017). 
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that Facebook is working towards ‘generalization of AI’70 which will, it is argued, 
be ‘capable of enhancing the speed at which applications can be built by ‘a 
hundred-x magnitude’, expanding possibilities for impact in fields ranging from 
medicine to transportation’.71 Advances in AI technology are vaulting toward the 
exponential as computer capacity and speed double every two years.72 The 
Stanford Report predicts that as driverless cars fall into common use, they will 
form the first public impressions of AI in a corporeal form.73 This experience will 
be an important one for AI, since we are on the cusp of a surge of AI with a 
physical embodiment. The Stanford Report also predicts that the typical North 
American city will by 2030 feature personal robots, driverless trucks and flying 
cars.74  
These AI systems present a spectrum of immediate issues that may require a 
regulatory response. Some are likely to be dealt with by developers as they come 
to their attention, and end users of the system may deal with others as they refine 
their use of the system and work with developers in overcoming issues as and 
when they arise. In this Part, we outline several of the issues that may require a 
regulatory response including biases that appear in law enforcement decisions 
made by AI systems, safety, particularly in relation to driverless cars, the lack of a 
human ‘heart’ when relying on AI in judicial decision making, privacy in relation 
to a vast number of applications, and the pressing problems associated with 
unemployment caused by increasing rates of automation supported by AI. 
1. Bias 
The coalescing of AI and big data opens significant possibilities for the 
synthesis and analysis of that data, but it also stands to compound problems that 
presently exist in that process. These include unintended racism, sexism and 
discrimination in the outcomes of data analysis.75 Ajunwa, Crawford and Ford 
have proposed a model to regulate big data to address privacy concerns and to 
allow a pathway to correct erroneous assumptions made from an assemblage of 
                                                     
70 Steven Levy, INSIDE FACEBOOK’S AI MACHINE BACKCHANNEL (2017), 
https://backchannel.com/inside-facebooks-ai-machine-7a869b922ea7 (last visited Mar 13, 
2017). 
71 Id. 
72 This is known as Moore’s Law after the co-founder of Intel who predicted in 1965 
that computing power would double every year (later revised to every two years). There is 
some speculation that this rate of change is no longer happening. See Tom Simonite, 
Moore’s Law is Dead. Now What?,  MIT TECHNOL. REV. (2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/ (last visited 
Mar 14, 2017); See also PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR 
THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 287 (2015). 
73 STONE ET AL., supra note 59 at 18–25. 
74 STONE ET AL., supra note 59, 18-23 (automated vehicles), 24-25 (home robots), 7, 18, 
20 (flying vehicles). 
75 Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
June 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-
intelligences-white-guy-problem.html (last visited Mar 13, 2017); Kate Crawford, Can an 
Algorithm be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated Publics, 41 SCI. TECHNOL. 
HUM. VALUES 77–92 (2016). 
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that data.76 Bias can be difficult to detect, and if care is not taken can ‘become part 
of the logic of everyday algorithmic systems’.77 These biases have arisen in a law 
enforcement context: algorithms performing predictive risk assessments of 
defendants committing future crimes were making mistakes with risk scores for 
black defendants, giving them high risk scores at almost double the rate of white 
defendants.78 Conversely, risk scores were mistakenly low for white defendants.79 
Bias also arises in the work of private platforms that filter, index, and sort online 
content and mediate communications.80 Crawford sees at least some of this as a 
manifestation of a bias problem with data and calls for vigilance in AI system 
design and training to avoid built-in bias.81 Bias issues such as these are unlikely to 
provoke a regulatory response if they are dealt with in AI system design. However, 
these issues can be ameliorated with regulation that requires either careful design 
or prompt troubleshooting when the issues are identified. 
2. Safety 
AI is being touted as a solution to a number of social problems. However, 
when it is implemented in a social context, it also presents a range of safety 
issues.82 For example, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks have the 
potential to improve safety on roads if they succeed in reducing accidents caused 
by driver error such as inattention, impairment, slow reaction times and 
inappropriate risk-taking. Social benefits potentially include improving mobility 
for those unable to drive, or those that live in heavily traffic congested urban 
areas.83  Hence, there is an urgency to deploy autonomous vehicles and developers 
                                                     
76 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Joel S. Ford, Health and Big Data: An Ethical 
Framework for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs, 44 J. 
LAW. MED. ETHICS 474 (2016). 
77 Crawford, supra note 78. 
78 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to 
Predict Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA, 2016, 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
(last visited Nov 18, 2016). 
79 Id. 
80 Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms,  in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS 
ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167–93 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo 
Boczkowski, & Kirsten Foot eds., 2013); Nicolas Suzor, Digital constitutionalism: Using 
the rule of law to evaluate the legitimacy of governance by platforms,  (2017), 
https://osf.io/ymj3t/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016). 
81 Crawford, supra note 78; See also: Kate Crawford, DARK DAYS: AI AND THE RISE OF 
FASCISM (2017), http://schedule.sxsw.com/2017/events/PP93821 (last visited Mar 13, 
2017). 
82 Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George Bekey, Robot ethics: Mapping the issues for a 
mechanized world, 175 ARTIF. INTELL. 942–949, 945–946 (2011); Drew Simshaw et al., 
Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing Risks, 22 
RICHMOND J. LAW TECHNOL. 1–38 (2015); Eliezer Yudkowsky, Cognitive biases 
potentially affecting judgment of global risks, 1 GLOB. CATASTROPHIC RISKS 13 (2008).  
83 JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 78–83 (2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-
technologies (last visited Jun 29, 2017). In this report, the McKinsey Global Institute 
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have already been testing autonomous vehicles on public roads. Indeed, the 
authors of the Stanford Report expect that ‘transportation is likely to be one of the 
first domains in which the general public will be asked to trust the reliability and 
safety of an AI system for a critical task’.84  
However the safety risks present in autonomous vehicles include the risk of 
accidents that may not otherwise have occurred; accidents created by even minor 
software or hardware errors, flawed or deficient programming of software, or 
unethical decision-making in the face of a high-risk, multi-risk scenario.85 
Regulation is key to providing an environment that will give the technology a 
chance to develop to its full potential, while protecting the public from 
unacceptable risks.86 Public regulators are already developing regulatory 
frameworks for safety assurance during the development and testing phases.87 
These frameworks extend to design standards, vehicle modification, and the 
                                                                                                                                       
identifies government regulation as potentially both an enabler and barrier to the socio-
economic benefits of autonomous vehicles. 
84 STONE ET AL., supra note 57, 18. 
85 Lin, Abney, and Bekey, supra note 82 at 945. Examples of programming issues 
present with autonomous vehicles include for example, the trolley-car problem. 
Programming issues may be highly specific and unique to certain cultures, geographical 
terrain, or indigenous fauna. See for example, reports that Volvo is working on difficulties 
arising with the animal detection system in its autonomous vehicles when confronted with 
the unusual way in which kangaroos move. The system had previously been tested on 
moose in Sweden: Jake Evans, THE VERY AUSTRALIAN PROBLEM OF ROOS AND DRIVERLESS 
CARS ABC NEWS (2017), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-24/driverless-cars-in-
australia-face-challenge-of-roo-problem/8574816 (last visited Jun 29, 2017).  
86 Upon the introduction of the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy in the US, President 
Obama noted, ‘the quickest way to slam the brakes on innovation is for the public to lose 
confidence in the safety of new technologies’: Barack Obama, SELF-DRIVING, YES, BUT 
ALSO SAFE PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2016/09/19/Barack-Obama-Self-driving-yes-but-also-safe/stories/201609200027 (last 
visited Jun 29, 2017); US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY (2016), 
https://www.transportation.gov/AV (last visited Jun 29, 2017). 
87 See for example, US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 86; 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT (UK), THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS: A CODE OF 
PRACTICE FOR TESTING - MOVING BRITAIN AHEAD (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automated-vehicle-technologies-testing-code-
of-practice (last visited Jun 29, 2017); (SVG), STRASSENVERKEHRSGESTZ, (Road Traffic 
Act, Germany), amended in June 2017 to allow for automated vehicles on public roads; 
NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION AUSTRALIA, REGULATORY REFORMS FOR 
AUTOMATED ROAD VEHICLES (2016); PILOT PROJECT AUTOMATED VEHICLES, ONTARIO 
REGULATION 305/15 UNDER HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ACT, RSO 1990, C H 8, (2014). The UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON ROAD TRAFFIC, VIENNA, (1968), (Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic), Articles 8 (5bis) and 39(1) were amended to facilitate use of autonomous vehicles 
on public roads, while ensuring the driver of the vehicle maintained its position in a 
superior role. The justifications for the amendment to the Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic are included as an appendix to UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, INLAND TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, WORKING PARTY 
ON ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE WORKING 
PARTY ON ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY 11 (2014).  
 Nudging Robots 20 
 
 
development of safety principles, criteria and assurance standards that are 
‘efficient, affordable and create a minimal administrative burden’.88  
The success of AI in solving social problems will ultimately lie in public and 
regulatory confidence in its use, and much of this confidence will turn upon trust 
in safety assurance.89 Safety, in this sense, ought not be confined to physical safety, 
but should extend to concern for non-physical harm90 such as privacy, security, and 
the dehumanization of care for people at their most vulnerable.91 For example, the 
benefit of AI-enabled healthcare robots could be impeded by lack of regulation to 
assure public trust and confidence across a range of safety issues including these 
types of non-physical harm. 
These risks are most acute with personal care robots. Trust and confidence in 
AI assisted robots may be hard-won in personal care situations given that they 
have traditionally involved human-to-human interaction.92 Also, to be effective and 
efficient, personal care robots must be able to access personal and medical 
information, ‘know… and possibly shar[e] the location of medication, objects and 
people’,93 connect with hospital or other healthcare networks, and connect with 
networked technology such as personal devices including phones, wearable 
devices, or mobile applications.94 The unprecedented amount of personal and 
medical information that could potentially be accessed, used, processed and stored 
by personal care robots is vulnerable to the same privacy and security concerns 
raised in relation to the Internet of Things.95 Aside from these security and privacy 
concerns, the health care context may raise unique safety concerns, for example, if 
                                                     
88 NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION AUSTRALIA, supra note 87 at 14; Current 
projects: Automated vehicle trial guidelines, NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION, 
http://www.ntc.gov.au/current-projects/automated-vehicle-trial-guidelines/ (last visited Jun 
29, 2017). 
89 STONE ET AL., supra note 59 at 35–36; Simshaw et al., supra note 82 at 8–10. 
90 In the healthcare context see Bernd Carsten Stahl & Mark Coeckelbergh, Ethics of 
healthcare robotics: Towards responsible research and innovation, 86 ROBOT. AUTON. 
SYST. 152–161 (2016); Simshaw et al., supra note 82; David D. Luxton, Susan Leigh 
Anderson & Michael Anderson, Chapter 11 - Ethical Issues and Artificial Intelligence 
Technologies in Behavioral and Mental Health Care,  in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
BEHAVIORAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 255–276 (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124202481000118 (last visited Jun 
28, 2017). 
91 Healthcare robots include surgical, routine-task and personal care robots. See 
Simshaw et al., supra note 82 at 9–10; Stahl and Coeckelbergh, supra note 90 at 154, 157; 
Luxton, Anderson, and Anderson, supra note 90. 
92 Laurel D. Riek, Chapter 8 - Robotics Technology in Mental Health Care,  in 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN BEHAVIORAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 185–203, 194 
(David D. Luxton ed., 2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124202481000088 (last visited Jun 
28, 2017). 
93 Simshaw et al., supra note 82 at 11–12. 
94 Id. at 13–15. 
95 Lin, Abney, and Bekey, supra note 82 at 945; Simshaw et al., supra note 82; 
Similarly complex safety issues arise with the non-commercial or recreational use of 
drones. See Roger Clarke & Lyria Bennett Moses, The regulation of civilian drones’ 
impacts on public safety, 30 COMPUT. LAW SECUR. REV. 263–285 (2014). 
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an external party can hack medical devices such as pacemakers.96 These risks 
escalate with unsophisticated home users.97 Again, we should give careful 
consideration to regulation that can address these concerns. 
3. Legal Decision-Making 
AI has been applied in highly specific legal tasks such as sentencing and 
judicial interpretation in an effort to improve transparency and consistency in 
judicial decisions.98 However, these systems have been criticized as lacking 
capacity to exercise discretion and make situational value judgments. Concerns 
have been raised about mechanistic reliance upon these applications of AI and 
their capacity to influence and shape the behavior of people involved in the 
decision-making process. 
Decision-making in the application of legal principles necessarily involves 
discretion. Decision-making in sentencing relies on ‘induction and intuition as well 
as the capacity to assess the social impact of the decision’.99 These have not yet 
proven to be among AI’s greatest strengths. There is a significant body of 
scholarship that argues against using AI in making definitive legal decisions,100 and 
cautions against even a narrowly limited role for AI in informing human 
decisions.101 As Simpson argued, even if AI is able to approximate human 
discretion in sentencing decision-making, the question that remains is the extent to 
                                                     
96 David D. Luxton et al., Chapter 6 - Intelligent Mobile, Wearable, and Ambient 
Technologies for Behavioral Health Care,  in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN BEHAVIORAL 
AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 137–162 (2016), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124202481000064 (last visited Jun 
28, 2017); Simshaw et al., supra note 82 at 22. 
97 Simshaw et al., supra note 82 at 22. 
98 Maria Jean J. Hall et al., Supporting discretionary decision making with information 
technology: a case study in the criminal sentencing jurisdiction, , 9 (2005), 
http://www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.1/2005.2.1.uoltj.Hall.1-36.pdf (last visited Mar 12, 2017); 
Trevor Bench-Capon & Henry Prakken, Argumentation,  in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
AND LAWYERS 61–80 (Arno R. Lodder & Anja Oskamp eds., 2006), 
http://link.springer.com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/chapter/10.1007/1-4020-4146-2_3 (last 
visited Mar 13, 2017); Hall et al., supra note. 
99 Hall et al., supra note 98 at 9. 
100 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING (2001), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=289789 (last visited Mar 13, 2017); Philip Leith, The 
Judge and the Computer: How Best ‘Decision Support’?, 6 ARTIF. INTELL. LAW 289–309 
(1998); Philip Leith, The Emperor’s New Expert System, 50 MOD. LAW REV. 128–132 
(1987); Philip Leith, The rise and fall of the legal expert system, 30 INT. REV. LAW 
COMPUT. TECHNOL. 94–106 (2016); Cooper, supra note 65 at 97–99; John O. McGinnis & 
Russell G. Pearce, The great disruption: How machine intelligence will transform the role 
of lawyers in the delivery of legal services,  (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436937 (last visited Mar 10, 2017). 
101 URI J SCHILD, EXPERT SYSTEMS AND CASE LAW (1992); John Zeleznikow, Building 
decision support systems in discretionary legal domains, 14 INT. REV. LAW COMPUT. 
TECHNOL. 341–356 (2000); Paul Lippe, Daniel Martin Katz & Dan Jackson, Legal by 
Design: A New Paradigm for Handling Complexity in Banking Regulation and Elsewhere 
in Law, , 4, 13, 20 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539315 
(last visited Mar 10, 2017); Abdul Paliwala, Rediscovering artificial intelligence and law: 
an inadequate jurisprudence?, 30 INT. REV. LAW COMPUT. TECHNOL. 107–114 (2016). 
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which ‘an algorithm can have a heart’.102 Simpson questions whether ‘such 
algorithms [can] deal with the unexpected, quirky or unique individual that may 
require appeals to a sense of justice?’103 Lippe et al propose that an optimal 
combination of AI and humans is required to provide balance.104 
These concerns animate Article 22 of the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation, which creates a new right for individuals ‘not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which 
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him 
or her’.105 The implication, at least in Europe, is that from 2018 a human must 
somehow be involved in making the decisions. How effective this is likely to be 
remains to be seen. Public regulators in all jurisdictions similarly ought to consider 
the risks of allowing the involvement of AI in making automated final legal 
decisions. 
Even where the decision is not automated, but say AI is used to support 
human decision-making, public regulators ought to be wary of undesirable risks 
and consequences. Reliance upon AI systems in judicial decision-making enlivens 
long-standing fears that reducing human processes to their most mechanistic may 
have an unintended regulatory effect.106 That is, once a process is reduced to its 
most mechanistic, it may make the humans involved in the decision-making 
process more compliant or programmable to the process.107 Even where the goal 
and purpose of involving AI in legal decision-making is to increase consistency, 
there are still risks that it will lead to standardization,108 which in automated legal 
decision-making processes can have a regulatory effect on people involved.109 This 
regulatory impact may extend to an unintended chilling effect on individualization, 
even where the legislature intended there to be some flexibility.110 People involved 
in the decision-making process may have difficulty deviating from the 
standardization in order for example to ‘have a heart’,111 to ‘introduce an element of 
humanity in special circumstances’112 or to consider whether the decision is in the 
best interests of society.113  
                                                     
102 Brian Simpson, Algorithms or advocacy: does the legal profession have a future in a 
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OF 27 APRIL 2016 ON THE PROTECTION OF NATURAL PERSONS WITH REGARD TO THE 
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA, AND 
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visited Jul 26, 2017) to take effect from 25 May 2018. 
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107 Id. at 498–499. 
108 Hall et al., supra note 98. 
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111 Simpson, supra note 102 at 56. 
112 Hall et al., supra note 60 at 33. 
113 Oskamp and Tragter, supra note 109; Paliwala, supra note 101 at 112–113. 
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The array of concerns surrounding the use of AI systems in judicial decision-
making is likely to be managed by the continual refinement of how AI systems are 
deployed by people in the decision-making process: the judiciary and their 
administrators and should ultimately be regulated. 
4. Privacy 
The leaps in advancement that are the promise of AI will sometimes turn on 
the quality and quantity of information available to it to inform AI learning. Public 
regulators will need to regulate to protect the privacy of individuals if large data 
sets are disclosed to tech companies with AI capabilities. For example, maintaining 
patient privacy should be paramount where data sets held by public health services 
are shared with technology companies. This should be so even where data is 
disclosed for a specific purpose and is technically compliant with current 
regulatory disclosure models. Even so, sensitivities surrounding well-intentioned 
disclosures should result in a regulatory response, even where the disclosure 
technically complies with existing regulatory processes.114 Such a regulatory 
response may be because the existing regulatory compliance process did not 
contemplate the scale of the disclosure, the use to which the data is put by AI 
systems, or how the data might be used and stored by private entities not 
previously considered an interested stakeholder in that type of data at the time the 
regulatory process was settled.115 Such a regulatory response may involve the 
                                                     
114 See for example the debate surrounding the disclosure of private health data of an 
estimated 1.3 million UK patients in a collaboration between DeepMind and the Royal Free 
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surrounding this disclosure is explored in Julia Powles & Hal Hodson, Google DeepMind 
and healthcare in an age of algorithms,  HEALTH TECHNOL. (2017), 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12553-017-0179-1 (last visited Mar 20, 2017). 
115 See Sam Shead, THE UK DATA REGULATOR HAS RULED THAT GOOGLE DEEPMIND’S 
FIRST DEAL WITH THE NHS WAS ILLEGAL BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA (2017), 
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imposition of a command and control model heavily restricting future access to 
such data sets. 
5. Unemployment 
The socio-economic and socio-political impact of AI is a serious risk for 
public regulators. The deployment of AI in workplaces via algorithms, robotics or 
automation targeting increased speed, efficiency, or safety is expected to radically 
change the workforce.116 These concerns speak to a fundamental issue beyond the 
economics of increased productivity. The sheer scale of the disruptive impact on 
wages and employment is unlikely to be matched by increased productivity and 
may instead ‘exacerbate inequality rather than promote greater opportunity and 
shared prosperity’.117 Regulators must consider issues such as the benefits that 
society can attain from AI, and how regulators can support workers through the 
expected job displacement if the scale of that displacement is anything approaching 
the levels anticipated. Public regulators need to consider the socio-economic and 
socio-political dis-equilibrium that might be caused if the AI revolution causes 
widespread unemployment. Ultimately, regulators must consider if society will 
require a living wage paid for by taxes on robots.118 
Adverse impacts on employment will not be confined to manufacturing or 
blue-collar work where robots are already used.119 While unskilled routine tasks 
that lend themselves to automation are at high risk, jobs that are highly skilled 
involving high levels of dexterity, creativity, social intelligence, collaboration, 
negotiation, and problem solving will also be at risk with further advances in 
technology.120 Every robot introduced into the workplace is estimated to have a 
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sizable impact on wages and employment/population ratios.121 As the use of robots 
in workplaces increases, the aggregate effect on employment and wages is 
expected to increase.122 
The pace of change and the sheer extent of displacement caused by the effects 
of automation, robots and AI on wages and employment will be unprecedented. 
Workers will be marginalized and forced to upskill to find work.123 The World 
Bank has cautioned that public regulators are ‘in a race between skills and 
technology’, and for many skills ‘people are losing the race’.124 At least part of the 
answer is to reform education and training, but as the World Bank has observed, 
these types of reforms have such a long lag time until they can prove effective that 
targeted educational reforms must begin early, and in youth.125 Therefore, a 
regulatory response needs to consider support for education, training, and the 
process of transitioning displaced workers through the process of job disruption 
and reemployment.126 Public regulators ought to influence education and training 
agendas now to ensure the development of resilient, transferrable skills, not easily 
automated, that lend themselves to a lifetime of working with and adapting to 
technological change.127 Longer working lifetimes and the pace of technological 
development may see low-skilled workers experience this type of job disruption 
more than once. 
In this Part we have outlined examples of problems associated with current 
applications of AI systems that will provoke a regulatory response. The examples 
provided illustrate concrete problems and the possibility of far greater, even 
existential, problems if the development of AI is left unattended. As we set out in 
the next Part, regulating AI systems is an extremely difficult problem to solve. 
Formulating the regulatory response will be a challenging one for any regulator. As 
specific problems manifest, fear, anxiety or populist concerns, whether evidence-
based or not, may create an urge in the regulator to step in. However, we argue for 
a considered, principled and consultative approach. 
III. THE DIFFICULTY IN REGULATING AI 
Even in the simplest of industries, ‘regulation is extraordinarily difficult’.128 
When considering the regulation of new technologies, former justice of the High 
Court of Australia, Michael Kirby noted that ‘the normal organs of legal regulation 
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often appear powerless’.129 Further along that continuum, regulating the 
development of AI may yet be the hardest task for regulators to tackle. 
Regulation is often implemented as a means to avoid or limit risks to human 
health or safety, or to the environment or against some moral hazard such as gene 
manipulation.130 However, the real risks of AI may yet be unknown and perhaps are 
unknowable. This necessarily makes them difficult to evaluate for the purposes of 
risk assessment which involves balancing a range of social attitudes and will often 
reflect the culture and values of the society in which it is deployed. However, it is 
clear that the variety of applications of AI in operation today poses a range or a 
spectrum of risks. 
A. The Range of Risks Associated With AI and AGI 
In Part II we outlined a range or spectrum of classes of AI – from narrow AI 
through to AGI. However, the level of risk associated with the applications within 
each class does not directly correlate to the class. The applications of AI within 
each class could pose a range of risks that might range from low to moderate to 
high. Further, an application of AI in the narrow class may have the potential to 
become stronger as the AI learns or develops. Whether that AI could then develop 
into AGI and thus pose a greater risk is often unknowable. Still further, the type of 
risk posed by each application may not be the same within each class of AI. For 
example, with a particular application of AI there might be a low risk to safety or 
to human life, but a high risk of a breach of privacy, or a high risk of causing 
unemployment. Therefore, it is too simplistic to merely take a class of AI such as 
narrow AI and to seek to regulate it based upon a presumed level of risk. A still 
further complicating factor is that similar types of application will be used 
differently in different industries or areas. For example, the same narrow AI 
application used in a product in the aviation industry may be applied to a different 
product in an agricultural setting. This will very likely mean that different 
regulatory agencies will be required to regulate the same AI but in different 
applications. Taking this complication one step further, the risk posed by the 
application’s use in the agricultural setting may be lower than when the same AI is 
applied in the aviation industry. Therefore, the same AI application will have to be 
treated differently by two separate agencies. 
Public regulators must become informed about the AI used in their field, 
assess the risks posed by the AI application as they are used in the industry in 
which they operate, and regulate appropriately. Earlier research has acknowledged 
that the reliability and fidelity of organisations involved ought to be evaluated 
based on factors including the intended use to which the technology might be 
put.131 Armed with a deeper understanding of the industry and the intended use of 
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the AI, stakeholders involved in informing the regulatory approach will be better 
placed to ask the right questions to assuage, or at least contextualise, their concerns 
about levels of risk. Iterative and cooperative involvement of all stakeholders 
including public regulators is the key to avoiding the necessity to hastily adopt 
command and control regulatory action and its unintended consequences.132 We 
therefore must consider the type of risk that different classes and types of AI pose – 
starting with a look at the systemic nature of AI risk that exists even now. 
B. Systemic Risk 
Not all applications of AI will eventuate in a ‘singularity’ scale event.133 
However, immediate systemic risk issues are present with existing AI 
applications.134 Systemic risk is the embedded risk ‘to human health and the 
environment in a larger context of social, financial and economic risks and 
opportunities’.135 Systemic risks exist in an atmosphere of uncertainty and they are 
not restrained by sector, domain or geography.136 Assessed at its height, strong AI 
or AGI presents inherent systemic risk.137 However, the integrated nature and 
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embeddedness of even narrow AI’s deployment into complex, interdependent 
social, financial and economic systems or networks amplifies the potential for risk 
impact, particularly where it is deployed in a pervasive way.138 The more complex 
and non-linear these networks are, the easier it is for the impacts of an AI ‘incident’ 
to proliferate rapidly throughout the network affecting multiple stakeholders.139 
Systemic risks are problematic for regulation. While systemic risks are not 
unknown to public regulators,140 the potential size of the connectedness of the 
network that AI can access is unprecedented. For these reasons, it is unlikely that 
command and control models of regulation would be effective to regulate systemic 
risk.141 
According to van Asselt and Renn, systemic risk should be managed via ‘a 
cautious and flexible strategy that enables learning from restricted errors, new 
knowledge, and visible effects, so that adaption, reversal, or adjustment of 
regulatory measures is possible’.142 Then the public regulator, business and society 
can ensure that there are ‘early warning systems’ are in place to detect risk if it 
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eventuates.143 Then public regulators could initially develop agreed principles that 
synthesise those things that need to be considered before formulating the processes 
necessary to govern those risks.144 
In the regulation of AI, the mix and interplay of stakeholders will be 
important in the formulation of principles to regulate the systemic risk, since it is 
non-state stakeholders that are at an information advantage in understanding the 
underlying matrix of science and technology in this area. The necessarily diverse 
mix of stakeholders and heterogeneous interests may make unified agreement on 
principles difficult.145 Those charged with developing principles will need to 
consider not only the technological and scientific concerns but also a range of 
societal norms and social and economic considerations.146 Settling on a set of 
principles will involve an element of trust in the science and technology. Creating a 
culture of iterative and cooperative development could engender this trust. Progress 
could be smoothed by a culture of fidelity and transparency from those with 
technical knowledge and scientific expertise in AI. Even if fuller information is 
available to public regulators, it will still be difficult to know everything necessary 
to regulate effectively because of the opacity of the algorithms that are not 
transparent on their face and are said to reside in an impenetrable black box.147 
C. The Risks of Failing to Regulate must be evaluated against the 
Risks Involved in Regulating AI 
Some academics have proposed that to avoid legal uncertainty and to avoid 
the difficulties associated with regulating AI we should merely adapt existing 
liability regimes.148 The common law has long adjusted to changes in technology 
iteratively, and to a large extent, this incremental approach helps to minimise the 
risks of incorrect decisions in regulatory policy.149 So, for example, a judicial 
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process that adapts tort law principles to place liability for harm on the entity that is 
most effectively able to mitigate the risk – the ‘least cost avoider’ – may 
adequately deal with concerns about potential harm caused by autonomous cars. 
Proponents of an iterative, ‘light touch’ approach favour responding to concrete 
problems as they arise, either through incremental adjustments to the common law 
or careful, limited and predominantly sui generis legislation if and as required.150 
The attractiveness of this approach is that it avoids the necessity of evaluating 
prospective risks – ensuring that regulation is targeted and limited to clear harms 
that courts and legislatures are able to understand. Those implementing and 
enforcing the laws could avoid much of the uncertainty surrounding new regulatory 
regimes. We do not subscribe to this light touch method and argue that AI requires 
a sui generis approach such as is outlined in this paper. 
Entrepreneurs and technological innovators maintain a healthy fear of 
regulation, which is often seen as red tape that hinders or stymies development.151 
Thierer, for example, argues for what he terms ‘permissionless innovation’; that 
‘unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm 
to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated’.152 Kurzweil too 
argues against regulation – preferring a free-market system to deal with problems if 
and when they arise. However, he does this while simultaneously urging caution.153 
Technology-rich industries have a long history of seeking to avoid the impulse to 
regulate that often accompanies widespread social fears about new technologies.154 
Scholars and industry representatives have expressed important concerns about the 
limits of regulation in high technology industries, and AI poses its own specific 
challenges for regulators. The key fear is that it may be too early to regulate AI, 
and that any regulation adopted today ‘may hinder developments that could prove 
essential for human existence.’155 Risk analysis too generally involves striking a 
balance, and the promise of AI may make taking some risk worthwhile. 
However, the calls for innovation without any regulation must be viewed 
critically. In Part II of this paper we provided a number of concrete examples of 
potential and existing problems and risks that current applications of AI developed 
without regulation pose for society. We also argued that there is at least the 
potential for AI development to cause harm to humanity and society. Arguing that 
regulation necessarily stymies innovation is a syllogistic fallacy; not all regulation 
stymies innovation. There are enough problems already with relatively narrow AI 
to persuade regulators that some regulation may indeed be necessary. While 
regulation may be difficult and may meet resistance from the industry, it is 
important that we as a society begin to consider the regulation of this vital area. We 
take up the challenge of contributing to AI research from a legal and regulatory 
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perspective in this paper. Next in this Part we detail some of the specific problems 
that regulators face when attempting to regulate in this area. 
D. The Problems Posed by AI for Regulators 
Scherer set out four general problems with regulating research and 
development of AI as problems with (1) discreetness, that is ‘AI projects could be 
developed without large scale integrated institutional frameworks’, (2) diffuseness, 
that is AI projects could be carried out by diffuse actors in many locations around 
the world; (3) discreteness, that is, projects will make use of discrete components 
and technologies ‘the full potential of which will not be apparent until the 
components come together’; and (4) opacity, that is, the ‘technologies underlying 
AI will tend to be opaque to most potential regulators’.156 
These broad categories succinctly capture some of the major problems facing 
those seeking to regulate AI. Certainly, AI is being developed and deployed in 
many parts of the world and it is difficult to predict what problems might arise 
when even two of these powerful technologies are combined. However, while there 
is the potential for AI development to occur without the need for large scale 
institutional frameworks such as government agencies, most of the investment in 
research and development is currently being made by large private companies such 
as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple and Amazon157 and this is where major 
innovations and developments will be likely to occur. This also exacerbates the 
opacity problem because private companies are apt to maintain secrecy, are not 
required to share information and in fact are benefitting from the law of patent to 
protect their legitimate interests in new technology from other developers. 
However, these broad problems represent only the top layer of issues and much 
more specific and deeper issues are at play through a deeper analysis. 
Scherer also proposed a system under which an agency would be set up to 
certify AI systems as safe,158 and where such certified systems would ‘enjoy limited 
tort liability’159 while uncertified systems would be subject to full liability. This 
approach concentrates on consequences of problems with AI and seeks to punish 
errant behaviour after it has occurred. This paper is more concerned with proposing 
solutions to regulating the development of AI ex ante. In this Part, we outline the 
potential difficulties associated with this process. As well as the general problems 
with regulating new technologies outlined above, there are a number of specific 
problems associated with regulating AI. 
1. The Pacing Problem 
A particular problem that regulators face is that developments in the 
technology outpace any attempt at regulating it.160 In the face of the continuously 
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increasing speed of innovation, legal and ethical oversight has lagged.161 This 
pacing problem plagues the regulation of technology generally and often leads to 
the technology disengaging or decoupling from the regulation that seeks to regulate 
it. Because the technology is at the forefront of scientific discovery and is 
developing so quickly, AI is affected by this issue more than other technologies. 
Attempts by regulators to address the pacing problem by future-proofing legislation 
often result in regulatory disconnect, where the laws are too general or vague to 
effectively serve their intended purpose or to provide meaningful guidance 
regarding any specific technology.162 Regulators need to find the optimal middle 
ground between regulation that is ineffective because it cannot keep pace with the 
rate of innovation, and regulation that is too general to be meaningful in specific 
cases. 
2. Information Asymmetry and the Collingridge Dilemma 
Private companies are investing heavily in AI research and development. The 
result is information asymmetries between those companies and public regulators 
seeking to understand those developments.163 Even if lawmakers are able to obtain 
technical information from developers, most non-technical folk will still be at a 
loss to understand a product, let alone predict what impacts it may have on 
individuals, societies and economies.164 This is the major cause of the pacing 
problem, but it is also an issue for courts trying to interpret and apply any 
legislation that has been implemented, as well as commentators and advocacy 
groups looking to hold companies accountable. It is an especial problem for 
regulators who need to fully understand the subject of regulation. 
This information problem forms the first half of the Collingridge Dilemma on 
the control of technology, which states that at the earliest stages of development of 
a new technology, regulation is difficult due to a lack of information, while in the 
later stages the technology is so entrenched in our daily lives that there is a 
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resistance to regulatory change from users, developers and investors.165 AI has 
already been deployed in society in a wide variety of fields, from medical 
diagnostics to criminal sentencing to social media, rendering the need to address 
this issue even more urgent.166 
3. Little Established Ethical Guidance, Normative Agreement, or 
Regulatory Precedent 
The ethical and social implications of introducing robots into mainstream 
society is a very weighty issue that remains largely unresolved, even as the 
consequences of this interaction are already unfolding.167 Other areas in which 
ethical issues arise include the use of military robots, human-robot relationships, 
such as the use of robots as sex partners, caregivers, and servants.168 Lin et al. argue 
that robot ethics issues can be classified in terms of safety and errors; law and 
ethics; and social impact, and consider the possibility and desirability of 
programming ethics into AI systems.169 A regulatory regime for the design and 
deployment of robots and AI in society must consider the need to include ethics 
rules in the code that underpins their operation. That system of ethics must reflect a 
broad normative consensus on what ethical values robots and AI systems should 
include. 
4. Regulatory Delay and Uncertainty 
Regulatory delay170 occurs as regulators consider if and when they will 
approve the implementation of a new development. For example legislators may 
pre-emptively ban the commercialisation of new products in response to public 
concerns, acting even before enough research can be conducted to ascertain 
whether the concerns are valid or well founded. This delay causes uncertainty for 
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developers.171 Investors and developers are left in the dark while legislators decide 
what to do, sometimes having to withdraw funding and resources from what might 
turn out to be a useful and lucrative innovation because they are no longer able or 
willing to bear the risk.172 This effect adds to the concerns of developers about 
regulators seeking to regulate the development of AI. 
Of course, some social benefits that may come from innovation and 
development of AI may well be lost or limited if regulation is implemented 
prematurely.173 Sunstein in particular has adverted to the problems associated with 
adopting what is known as the ‘precautionary principle’ to regulate risk.174 People, 
he argues, are nothing if not ‘predictably irrational’;175 and tend to be overly 
concerned with losses rather than the gains that might be made from, for example, 
new technology. He argues that regulators should therefore avoid regulating purely 
on the threat of unknown future risks.176 However, at the same time, he warns 
against regulatory inaction ‘because a probability of harm is, under many 
circumstances, a sufficient reason to act’.177 Ultimately, Sunstein urges that ‘a wide 
variety of adverse effects may come from inaction, regulation, and everything in 
between’, noting the need to ‘attempt to consider all of those adverse effects and 
not simply a subset’.178 This measured approach should find some favour. After 
over 60 years of developments in AI, regulation now could not be criticised as 
being overly reactive or precautionary. As we argued in Part II, as AI development 
continues apace, some caution in this area is warranted. 
5. Coordination across Regulatory Bodies 
Coordinating the many regulatory bodies involved in a new technology is a 
problem that plagues every innovating industry.179 Already, many groups and 
industry bodies have developed codes of conduct and standards to regulate the 
development of AI.180 Given the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of AI 
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research, coordinating these industry bodies is no less a challenge for public 
regulators in this field.181 An AI regulatory regime would need to account for 
existing laws, other governmental regulatory bodies, and self-regulatory industry 
bodies that develop professional codes of ethics, and it needs to do this across 
many different fields such as neuroscience; neurobiology; mechanical, electrical 
and software engineering; psychology; innovation studies; and economics and 
finance.182 Soft law developments such as industry codes of practice, principles and 
standards developed by groups of industry participants vary and can often be at 
cross-purposes. Marchant and Wallach propose that this multiplicity of 
perspectives and approaches requires an ‘issues manager’ to oversee and 
coordinate the various principles, codes and other approaches.183 Marchant and 
Wallach have proposed to form a Governance Coordination Committee to ‘provide 
oversight, cultivate public debate, and evaluate the ethical, legal, social, and 
economic ramifications of … important new technologies’.184 The current efforts to 
attempt to govern using these industry-led soft law approaches is discussed further 
in Part IV. 
6. Agency Capture 
Regulatory failure due to agency capture occurs where regulators become 
sympathetic with the industry they are regulating. This can be the result of any 
number of factors, such as a high frequency of interaction between industry and 
regulators, industry reps ‘buying off’ regulators with gifts like free lunches or 
sponsorship to attend conferences, or a ‘revolving door’ for employees between 
regulatory agencies and industry.185 While each of these problems is relatively 
common throughout innovating industries, the AI industry is particularly at risk of 
the revolving door issue.186 The information asymmetry issue where AI companies 
hold all the relevant information about the technology makes the knowledge and 
expertise acquired by employees of AI developers particularly valuable to 
regulators, who are likely to be interested in employing former AI developers when 
(and if) they can. 
                                                     
181 Bennett Moses, supra note 179. 
182 Christopher-Paul Milne & Joyce Tait, Evolution Along the Government - 
Governance Continuum: FDA’s Orphan Products and Fast Track Programs as Exemplars 
of “What Works” for Innovation and Regulation, 64 FOOD DRUG LAW J. 733–754 (2009); 
PETER W. B. PHILLIPS, GOVERNING TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: 
WHO’S IN CHARGE? (2007); POTTS, supra note 179. 
183 Gary E. Marchant & Wendell Wallach, Governing the Governance of Emerging 
Technologies,  in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 136–
152, 142 (Kenneth W Abbott, Gary E. Marchant, & Braden R. Allenby eds., 2014). 
184 See Gary E. Marchant & Wendell Wallach, Coordinating Technology Governance, 
XXXI ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 2015, at 43–50. 
185 Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: a precautionary tale, 28 HARV. ENVIRON. LAW REV. 
281 (2004); BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND 
HARM PATIENTS (2013). 
186 See Anne Weismann, SILICON VALLEY COMPANIES LOBBY TO REMAIN 
UNREGULATED THE NEW YORK TIMES (2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/10/24/silicon-valley-goes-to-
washington/silicon-valley-companies-lobby-to-remain-
unregulated?referer=https://t.co/86PwxwASfJ&nytmobile=0 (last visited Jul 26, 2017). 
 Nudging Robots 36 
 
 
7. Limited Enforcement Mechanisms and Jurisdiction Shopping 
Added to the complexities outlined above, the major players in the 
development of AI such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple are some of 
the biggest, most complex, and powerful corporations that the world has seen. 
They own and control what Marx might have described as the means of production 
in this field. That is, the vast array of super powerful computers and the phalanx of 
the world’s best and brightest mathematicians and engineers required to churn the 
algorithms necessary to create AI. The power disparity between these players and 
government regulators, who often struggle to secure sufficient resources to operate, 
highlights the difficulties that might be faced by a regulator in trying to regulate 
these companies.187 This idea is further explored in Part IV below. 
The fact that the technology is relatively opaque188 also makes it easier for 
firms to hide wrongdoing and evade regulation. Volkswagen, for example, was 
able to create specific code to identify the tests used by regulators to measure 
emissions and make its car engines appear to run more cleanly than when under 
normal use. Similarly, recent reports suggest that Uber created a version of their 
app specifically designed to identify users likely to be regulators and prevent them 
from accessing the system to investigate concerns or collect evidence.189 
In Part III, we have outlined various risks associated with AI and broadly 
grouped applications of AI into 3 classes based upon the risks that each poses. We 
also highlighted the general and specific difficulties that regulators face when 
attempting to regulate new technologies, and particularly, AI. In Part IV, we 
outline how public regulators will need to adopt new strategies to begin to regulate 
AI as the old strategies lose effectiveness. One strategy will be to regulate based 
upon the relative risks associated with particular applications of AI. 
IV. THE NEED FOR REGULATORY INNOVATION 
Regulators face an extremely difficult challenge in responding to AI. As 
discussed above, regulators find it difficult to keep up with the pace of change; do 
not have all the information they require; must avoid over-regulation and 
uncertainty; require, but cannot rely too heavily on specialist knowledge obtained 
from industry; have to make do with enforcement mechanisms that are only 
partially effective; and need to make clear and justifiable policy decisions in a field 
that is highly contested. Traditionally, governments had the information and 
resources that put them in the best position to regulate in most instances. We have 
seen a long period where government held legislative control of the state. In the 
field of new technology, at least, the machinery of control is drifting away from 
government and is becoming decentred. In this Part, we review this decentring of 
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regulation and outline some examples of peer or self-regulation that has begun to 
proliferate in the vacuum of government control. 
We review both the regulatory theory literature and the legal literature on the 
regulation of technology. As will be shown, these theories have clear limitations 
when asked to respond to the development of new technologies but may still 
provide some guidance to regulators seeking to approach regulating AI. Regulatory 
theory that has developed over the last two decades such as responsive regulation 
and really responsive regulation are normative and propose what good regulation 
should include. They are also, by definition, ‘responsive’ and hence presuppose the 
existence of a regulatory framework. As such, they are best used to guide 
interactions between regulators and the regulated when regulatory systems are 
already in place. Further, responsive regulation is limited in its ability to regulate 
new technologies that exhibit the kinds of characteristics set out in Part III above – 
it lacks the flexibility required to react quickly enough in such a dynamic field. 
Further, while much can be learned from regulation of other emerging 
technologies, the regulation of AI must be sui generis. While in its nascent stages, 
it will require a more nuanced set of regulatory approaches. 
A. Regulating with Limited Resources in a Decentralised 
Environment 
For a long time, regulation was thought of mainly in terms of legal commands 
and sanctions. The state, in the classical model of regulation, is a powerful entity 
that can command obedience through a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.190 
It is now widely recognised that there are far more techniques in the regulation 
toolbox than ‘command and control’ style rules backed by sanctions.191 Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s concept of ‘responsive regulation’ for example sets out a graduated 
pyramid of interventions by the state in policing behaviour, in order to encourage 
and direct an optimal mix of regulatory work by private and public entities.192 The 
responsive element of responsive regulation is that, as the regulatory response 
moves up the pyramid, ‘escalating forms of government intervention will reinforce 
and help constitute less intrusive and delegated forms of market regulation’.193 That 
is, responsive regulation still requires government to assert a ‘willingness to 
regulate more intrusively’ and by so doing can guide the regulation where it is most 
effective, mostly through ‘less intrusive and less centralised forms of government 
intervention’.194 Ayres and Braithwaite proposed a pyramid of enforcement 
measures by government with the most intrusive command and control regulation 
at the apex and less intrusive measures such as self-regulation at the base. It is still 
government that maintains the ability and responsibility to ultimately regulate if 
required.195 The threat relies on government’s ability to inflict varying degrees of 
discretionary punishment or other forms of persuasion within the pyramidal 
structure if there is the regulated entity fails to comply with initial regulatory 
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attempts — this is referred to as tit-for-tat approach.196 The critical effect of 
responsive regulation was to highlight developments in alternative means of 
regulating other than command and control – and therefore avoid some of the more 
problematic effects of blunt regulatory tools. It appears, however, to be a tool that 
is still too blunt to hone new technologies such as AI. Part of the reason for this is 
that the traditional role of government has diminished over time. 
1. The Traditional Role of Government in Regulation 
When considering the regulatory role of the contemporary state in 2007, Hood 
and Margetts listed four resources of regulation that governments have in differing 
degrees in differing contexts: nodality, authority, treasure, and organisation. 
Nodality, referred to the government’s central position as a receiver and distributor 
of information that allows it access to and control of the full range of 
information.197 Governments held a strategic position with nearly full information 
about the area and topic of regulation.198 Authority refers to the authority of the 
government to determine what is legal199 and to ‘demand, forbid, guarantee, [and] 
adjudicate’.200 Treasure refers to the government’s assets both in money and other 
tangible assets such as buildings and equipment which gives it the power to control 
development at the time and place of its choosing.201 Organisation refers to the 
resources in people employed by government with the knowledge and skills to be 
able to carry out any required task. This includes ‘(soldiers, workers, bureaucrats), 
land, buildings, materials, computers and equipment’.202 The interaction of these 
roles traditionally held by government simplifies analysis of the role of government 
in regulation.203 When these theories are applied to the difficult tasks of regulating 
AI, the challenges that regulators face are clearly visible. In these contexts, the 
government’s nodality, authority, treasure and organisation have been depleted or 
usurped and are not always sufficient to match that of the major technology 
companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Apple. Part of the challenge 
of effectively regulating AI is to identify opportunities for regulatory agencies to 
influence other actors when these four resources are limited. 
Similarly, in the context of regulating AI, the emphasis of responsive 
regulation in a strong regulatory state that is ultimately still able to direct behaviour 
with effective sanctions, no longer fully reflects practical realities. It may still be an 
effective means of governing more stately industries such as the production of 
wool in Australia, for example, but we argue, that responsive regulation is not 
sufficiently flexible and nuanced to apply to a dynamic environment such as the 
development of AI. Further, it relies on the power of the state to impose the 
ultimate sanction at the apex of the pyramid; that is, the command and control 
regulation of an industry. The notion of government as at the apex of power 
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structures is arguably no longer applicable, if it truly ever was solely the case. This 
is especially so when considering the power, global reach and diffuse company 
structures of companies operating at ‘Google scale’. 
2. De-Centred Regulation 
Over the last three decades, regulatory scholars and regulatory agencies have 
been grappling with the ‘decentring’ of regulation, and with it, a recognition that 
regulation is not the exclusive work of states, and state power to command 
obedience.204 As Black contends, a ‘decentred understanding’ of regulation 
involves ‘complexity, fragmentation of knowledge and of the exercise of power 
and control, autonomy, interactions and interdependencies, and the collapse of the 
public/private distinction’.205 The hallmarks of ‘decentred’ regulation she argues 
are that it is ‘hybrid (combining governmental and non-governmental actors), 
multi-faceted (using a number of different strategies simultaneously or 
sequentially), and indirect’.206 The current environment surrounding the 
development of AI shows that if regulation of it is to succeed, that regulation must 
evolve in an environment that displays these characteristics. Those regulating in 
this field need to understand and work within these parameters. Black argued that 
decentred regulation: 
…should be indirect, focusing on interactions between the system and its 
environment. It should be a process of co-ordinating, steering, influencing, 
and balancing interactions between actors/systems, to organise themselves, 
using such techniques as proceduralization, collibration, feedback loops, 
redundancy, and above all, countering variety with a variety.207 
Regulators must address the challenges of regulating with limited resources. 
These resource constraints have curbed the impact of regulatory bodies in general. 
However, they are particularly debilitating in the context of new technologies that 
involve a steep learning curve and require regulatory bodies to engage deeply in 
the industry. Regulatory agencies that seek to regulate AI in this environment 
should first seek to engage with and work with the relevant actors to learn about 
and grapple with the complexities in the field. By doing this, they can begin to 
understand the motivations of the relevant players so that they might start to 
influence the direction AI development will take. This process, as Black 
recommends, will involve recurring loops of discussion and feedback where 
effective ideas are fostered, and redundant notions are jettisoned. Public regulators 
faced with resource constraints must do this while also managing a shifting 
regulatory environment where regulators are subject to pressure from interest 
groups and citizens to pursue conflicting agenda and must also consider how 
regulation of AI might affect regulatory work in other fields and industries. 
Regulators must also be able to reflect on the effectiveness of their strategies, often 
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in an information vacuum, and be able to change strategies when one approach 
does not work, is ineffective, or even retrograde.208 
B. Self-Regulation and Peer Regulation 
One result of decentred regulation is that governments that once held a central 
position of power and influence have ceded some of that influence and power to a 
dissipated group of regulatory participants that would ordinarily be the subject of 
regulation. Where political influence and power exists in those industries, self-
regulation evolves and becomes the default position. In recent years prominent 
figures from within the AI industry have begun to warn about the need to ensure 
that the development and deployment of AI technology is effectively regulated.209 
In the absence of government led intervention in the industry, those within the 
industry are regulating themselves. This is not typical self-regulation under the 
auspices of a formal government agency, but is self-regulation in a vacuum of input 
from government. 
Some academics have described a kind of self-regulation where the influence 
of corporate peers guides the behaviour of industry participants.210 Jessop describes 
a system of governance that limits the role of regulatory bodies and emphasises 
‘the reflexive self-organisation of independent actors involved in complex relations 
of reciprocal interdependence, with such self-organisation being based on 
continuing dialogue and resource-sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint 
projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in 
such situations’.211 This appears to describe what is happening in practice in 
relation to AI. Jessop emphasises the role of self-organisation of stakeholders to 
include: 
(1) the more or less spontaneous, bottom-up development by networks of 
rules, values, norms and principles that they then acknowledge and follow 
[and]; (2) increased deliberation and participation by civil society groups 
through stakeholder democracy, putting external pressure on the state 
managers and/or other elites involved in governance.212 
This bottom up development is happening now in the development of AI. 
Prominent industry participants have developed several codes of conduct and 
practice, and standards already and the next phase of coordinating these strategies 
has begun, all outside the auspices of government control. 
The challenges of regulating fast moving technology are so great that industry 
self-regulatory approaches are often presented as the most effective mechanism to 
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manage risk. Industry bodies are already forming to respond to fears about the 
ongoing deployment of AI systems in ways that could be interpreted as staving off 
what they might describe as clumsy and heavy-handed public regulation. One of 
the most prominent efforts is the Partnership on AI between Google, DeepMind, 
Facebook, Microsoft Apple, Amazon, and IBM, together with the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence 
(AAAI). The Partnership on AI’s purpose statement is to ‘benefit people and 
society’,213 and is said to have been ‘[e]stablished to study and formulate best 
practices on AI technologies, to advance the public’s understanding of AI, and to 
serve as an open platform for discussion and engagement about AI and its 
influences on people and society’.214 It has developed a series of tenets for the 
development of AI that commit its members to ongoing engagement with 
stakeholders to protect the privacy, security and other human rights of individuals. 
In doing so, the Partnership is taking on the role of a self-regulatory association, 
and potentially warding off more enforceable state-imposed regulatory obligations. 
Another industry-led initiative to attempt to regulate AI was developed at the 
Future of Life Institute’s Asilomar conference in January 2017. The 23 Asilomar 
principles as they are known are grouped under three headings: research issues, 
ethics and values, and longer-term issues. Principles falling within the longer term 
issues include principle 22 titled ‘Importance’. It states that ‘Advanced AI could 
represent a profound change in the history of life on Earth, and should be planned 
for and managed with commensurate care and resources’. Principle 23 titled 
‘Risks’ notes that ‘Risks posed by AI systems, especially catastrophic or existential 
risks, must be subject to planning and mitigation efforts commensurate with their 
expected impact’. Further, Principle 24 titled ‘Recursive Self-Improvement’ notes 
that ‘AI systems designed to recursively self-improve or self-replicate in a manner 
that could lead to rapidly increasing quality or quantity must be subject to strict 
safety and control measures’.215 These principles reflect concerns that even those 
within the industry hold about the development of, what from its description is, 
AGI. The Asilomar principles contain a similar basket of issues that are reflected in 
other industry codes or values statements in relation to AI. While they express 
well-meaning principles of behavior, quite who will enforce these control measures 
and what sanctions may be levied for their breach is uncertain. 
Another industry body, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), recently produced a discussion paper titled ‘Ethically Aligned Design: A 
Vision for Prioritising Human Well-Being with Artificial Intelligence and 
Autonomous Systems’.216 The Ethically Aligned Design project aimed to ‘bring 
together multiple voices in the Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems 
communities to identify and find consensus on timely issues’. Those issues address 
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concerns about how to ensure that AI does not infringe human rights, that the 
decisions of autonomous systems are accountable and transparent, and that there 
are checks in place to minimise risks through enhanced education.217  
Proponents of AI have sought to counter the fears long-expressed by science 
fiction authors by highlighting the positive and benign applications of AI already in 
place today.218 Developers suggest that technical contingency plans, like 
DeepMind’s ‘big red button’ are in place in case AI gets out of hand. The 
implication is that up to this limit – the ‘nuclear option’ of shutting down rogue AI 
completely – the developers of AI are already effectively regulating its 
development through initiatives like the Partnership on AI and the principles set 
out by IEEE. In this regard the Partnership on AI has endorsed the United States 
Government’s Report, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence.219 It is in 
the interests of the industry participants such as the Partnership on AI not to 
disavow the government’s position. It shows that the industry is very capable of 
self-regulating and that it is in lock-step with the government and its public 
regulators. In a classic statement of self-regulation that usurps the traditional role 
of public regulators, the Partnership on AI has stated that it will continue to pursue 
‘ongoing engagement … to bring stakeholders together, create best practices, share 
findings and insights, and to contribute to charting a path forward.’220 Perhaps, 
given the government’s retreat from regulating in this area, the Partnership on AI 
may be best placed to continue this work for the time being. 
It may well be that self-regulation will be effective in mitigating the most 
important risks of the development and deployment of AI systems. However, there 
is also a risk that self-regulation may not be sufficient.221 First, industry codes or 
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principles are not obligatory. The principles or codes are often drafted broadly as 
vision or values statements that do not contain any mandatory requirements but are 
guides to practice that may be ignored. Second, they lack effective enforcement 
regimes. Even if they do contain some element of obligation, participants may lack 
the will to enforce those obligations. Third, many different suggested approaches 
such as the IEEE standards or the principles proposed by the Partnership on AI or 
the Asilomar principles vary in their content and focus and lack a central governing 
body that will coordinate direction and compliance.222  
Certainly, it will be important to avoid regulation that is ineffective or unduly 
stymies research and development. we suggest that governments need to consider 
and engage with the concerns and risks associated with AI now in order to protect 
public interests that industry-led regulation is not well suited to addressing.223 
C. The Evolving Nature of Regulation 
Despite the efforts of those within the industry to self-regulate, the task of 
regulating the development and deployment of AI is increasingly pressing. The AI 
Now Report prepared after the AI Now public symposium hosted by the White 
House and New York University’s Information Law Institute in July 2016 set out 
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several key recommendations for future work in AI development. One of those 
recommendations was to: 
Increase efforts to improve diversity among AI developers and researchers, 
and broaden and incorporate the full range of perspectives, contexts, and 
disciplinary backgrounds into the development of AI systems. The field of 
AI should also support and promote interdisciplinary AI research 
initiatives that look at AI systems’ impact from multiple perspectives, 
combining the computational, social scientific, and humanistic.224 
The ongoing pace of change, and the notoriously slow response of lawyers 
and regulators, creates real challenges for this type of multidisciplinary 
collaboration. So much so that, in a cri de coeur, the Ethically Aligned Design 
report noted that ‘there is much to do for lawyers in this field that thus far has 
attracted very few practitioners and academics despite being an area of pressing 
need’.225 The report calls on lawyers to be ‘part of the discussions on regulation, 
governance, and domestic and international legislation in these areas.’226  
Russell, Dewey and Tegmark set out two policy questions they argue need to 
be addressed by regulators, academics and those in the industry: ‘(1) what is the 
space of policies worth studying, and how might they be enacted? (2) Which 
criteria should be used to determine the merits of a policy?’227 They proposed that 
the qualities that these policies should include ‘verifiability of compliance, 
enforceability, ability to reduce risk, ability to avoid stifling desirable technology 
development, likelihood of being adopted, and ability to adapt over time to 
changing circumstances’.228 It appears inevitable that there will eventually be some 
form of regulation of AI. The European Union has begun to develop Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics229 that will ultimately govern the development of robotics and AI 
in Europe. We discuss this further in Part V. 
In Table 1 below we set out some of the major theories of regulation that have 
evolved over the last two decades. Regulatory theory has developed from the 
prominent but increasingly less influential command and control style to more and 
more nuanced and adaptive approaches as increasingly complex situations have 
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demanded. As we suggest, many of these theories are either inappropriate or would 
be ineffective when regulating AI. 
Table 1 – Theories of regulation 
Theory Guiding principles 
‘Responsive 
Regulation’:230 a ‘tit-
for-tat’ approach to 
enforce compliance 
by persuasion and 
education before 
escalating up a 
‘pyramid’ of more 
punitive sanctions. 
Braithwaite, 2011:  
1. Think in context 
2. Listen actively (build commitment with 
stakeholders) 
3. Engage with fairness 
4. Praise those who show commitment 
5. Signal a preference for support and education 
6. Signal a range of escalating sanctions that may 
be used if necessary 
7. Engage a wider network of partners as 
regulatory responses increase in severity 
8. Elicit active responsibility from stakeholders 
where possible 
9. Evaluate regulations and improve practices. 231 
‘Smart regulation’  Prefer a mix of regulatory instruments while 
avoiding ‘smorgasboardism’; 
 Prefer less interventionist measures 
 Escalate up a pyramid of sanctions when 
required (responsive regulation) 
 Empower third parties to act as surrogate 
regulators 
 Maximise opportunities for win-win outcomes 





 Regulators, and the regulatory system as a 
whole, should use comprehensive risk 
assessment to concentrate resources on the 
areas that need them most; 
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 Regulators should be accountable for the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their activities, 
while remaining independent in the decisions 
they take; 
 All regulations should be written so that they 
are easily understood, easily implemented, and 
easily enforced, and all interested parties 
should be consulted when they are being 
drafted; 
 No inspection should take place without a 
reason; 
 Businesses should not have to give 
unnecessary information, nor give the same 
piece of information twice; 
 The few businesses that persistently break 
regulations should be identified quickly, and 
face proportionate and meaningful sanctions; 
 Regulators should provide authoritative, 
accessible advice easily and cheaply; 
 When new policies are being developed, 
explicit consideration should be given to how 
they can be enforced using existing systems 
and data to minimise the administrative burden 
imposed; 
 Regulators should be of the right size and 
scope, and no new regulator should be created 
where an existing one can do the work; and 
 Regulators should recognise that a key element 
of their activity will be to allow, or even 
encourage, economic progress and only to 
intervene when there is a clear case for 
protection. 
‘Regulatory craft’ 
(focusing on problem 
solving) 
1. Nominate potential problems for attention 
2. Define the problem precisely 
3. Determine how to measure impact 
4. Develop solutions or interventions 
5. Implement the plan with periodic monitoring, 
review, and adjustment 
6. Close project, allowing for long-term 
monitoring and maintenance.234 
‘Really Responsive 
regulation’ 
Regulators should be responsive to: 
 firms’ compliance responses (Responsive 
regulation); but also 
 the ‘attitudinal settings’ (operating and 
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cognitive framework of the target of 
regulation) 
 the institutional environment 
 the ‘logics of different regulatory strategies 
and tools’ 
 the regulatory regime’s own performance and 
effects 





In applying risk-based regulation, regulators 
should: 
 be responsive to regulated firms' behavior, 
attitude, and culture; institutional 
environments; interactions of controls; 
regulatory performance; and change; 
 take attitudinal matters on board 
 identify how attitudes vary across regulatory 
tasks; 
 ‘be clear about the degree to which any 
particular regulatory task can and should be 
guided by a risk-scoring system’236 
Risk-based regulation must focus on: 
 ‘detecting undesirable or non-compliant 
behaviour, 
 responding to that behaviour by developing 
tools and strategies,  
 enforcing those tools and strategies on the 
ground,  
 assessing their success or failure, and 
modifying them accordingly’.237 
 
Table 1 outlines a number of theories that describe traditional methods of 
regulation. While no one theory would apply as a whole to the regulation of AI, a 
risk-based approach in combination with several of the elements of Really 
Responsive Regulation and Smart Regulation may ultimately prove effective. 
Black and Baldwin’s Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation is perhaps the 
closest to this approach. It requires regulators to be responsive to ‘regulated firms' 
behavior, attitude, and culture; institutional environments; interactions of controls; 
regulatory performance; and change’. However, Black and Baldwin could not have 
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foreseen the changes in the AI environment that would occur subsequent to 2010 
when their article was written. The levels and speed at which responses to all of 
these elements in the AI environment would make it difficult for these responsive 
regulatory theories to adequately respond in good time. The proliferation of AI into 
our daily lives has been fast and furtive. The consequence is that public regulators 
will need to be even more responsive in the forms Black and Baldwin suggest. 
Perhaps a Really Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation would be required. 
However, we suggest a more nuanced approach is required in Part V. 
The regulation of AI requires a theory of regulation that is not bound by the 
normative straits in which the theories above evolved. Those theories detail a 
normative approach to regulation. They presuppose a regulatory environment 
already being in place and the ability of the government to impose its control if 
ultimately required to. This, as we have argued, is no longer the case. However, the 
main problem that each theory faces when it comes to new technologies such as AI 
is that the mechanisms to respond to change are too slow. They require the 
machinery of the state to respond to changes in the regulatory environment, but that 
machinery is not easily engaged and, when engaged, responds too slowly.  
Meanwhile, others have offered different and sometimes more concrete 
suggestions for how regulatory agencies can deal with the particular difficulties of 
regulating fast moving technological change: 
Table 2 – Applications of strategies 
Theory Guiding principles 










One Hundred Year 
Study on AI 
Government should: 
 Accrue greater technical expertise in AI 
 Remove impediments to research on the 
social impacts of AI 
 Increase public and private funding for 
research on the social impacts of AI 
 Resist pressure for ‘more’ and ‘tougher’ 
regulation that stifles innovation or forces 
innovators to leave the jurisdiction 
 Encourage a ‘virtuous cycle’ of 
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accountability, transparency, and 
professionalization among AI developers 
 Continually re-evaluate policies in the context 
of research on social impacts239 
Whitehouse report – 
Preparing for the Future 
of Artificial Intelligence 
Regulatory agencies should: 
 Recruit and develop technical expertise in AI 
 Develop a workforce with ‘more diverse 
perspectives on the current state of 
technology’ 
 Use risk-assessment to identify regulatory 
needs 
 Avoid increasing compliance costs or slowing 
development or adoption of beneficial 
innovations where possible 
 Avoid premature regulation that could stifle 
innovation and growth240 
Experimental innovation 
policy (OECD report, 
‘Making Innovation 
Work’) 
The quality and efficiency of public expenditure 
on regulation targeted at innovation can be improved 
by an experimental approach to policy-making. 
Regulators should accordingly: 
 Embed diagnostic monitoring and evaluation 
into regulatory programmes at the outset 
 Collaborate closely with private firms and 
non-governmental actors 
 Share and compare results of policy 
experimentation with other jurisdictions241 
 
Table 2 lists a set of strategies rather than broad theories. They are more 
practically applicable than theoretical. In that vein, many scholars have suggested 
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specific regulatory tools that may be useful in regulating new technologies such as 
AI which include: 
 Enhancing flexibility through ‘temporary regulation’ by using ‘experimental 
legislation’242 and sunset clauses to ‘define adaptable goals and enable the 
adjustment of laws and regulations according to the evolution of the 
circumstances’.243  
 Creating ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to allow firms to roll out and test new ideas 
‘without being forced to comply with the applicable set of rules and 
regulations’.244 
 Developing ‘anticipatory rulemaking’245 techniques that leverage feedback 
processes to enable ‘rulemakers to adapt to regulatory contingencies if and 
when they arise because a feedback effect provides relevant, timely, 
decentralized, and institution-specific information ex-ante.’246 
 Making increased use of data analysis to identify what, when, and how to 
regulate;247 
 Utilising the iterative development of the common law to adapt rules to new 
technological contexts where possible, and developing new specialist 
regulatory agencies where they are particularly needed;248 
 Using ‘legal foresighting’ to identify and explore possible future legal 
developments, in order to discover shared values, develop shared lexicons, 
forge a common vision of the future, and take steps to realise that vision;249 
 Creating new multi-stakeholder fora to help overcome information and 
uncertainty issues that stifle innovation or inhibit effective regulation.250 
While there is no shortage of suggested regulatory responses, it is hard to 
distil a clear set of concrete recommendations from the wide and varied literature. 
This may partly be due to the disparate nature of AI including the definitional 
problems outlined in Part II. Ultimately, one of the key problems is that while there 
are common regulatory challenges across different areas of innovation and 
technology policy, there are also highly context-specific challenges.251 Ensuring 
regulatory approaches are closely connected with their context requires individual 
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responses to different technologies in different locations at different times. As 
Brownsword points out, this means that inevitably, ‘the details of the regulatory 
regime will always reflect a tension between the need for flexibility (if regulation is 
to move with the technology) and the demand for predictability and consistency (if 
regulatees are to know where they stand)’.252 Brownsword concluded that ‘while 
we should try to develop stock (tried and trusted) responses to challenges that we 
know to be generic, simple transplantation of a particular regulatory response from 
one technology to another is not always appropriate’.253 
The spectrum of regulatory approaches from command and control to self-
regulation or peer regulation presents a quandary for those trying to regulate in this 
area. There is no quick fix that can be implemented to resolve the problems we 
have outlined. In the next Part, we consider some practical and innovative means to 
begin the process of regulating the development of AI that includes considering a 
number of tools from within self-regulation, and risk regulation theories. We 
conclude that, while these theories may eventually influence the regulation of AI, 
there is a moment in time now where all of the stakeholders may be able to 
influence the development and regulation of AI through cooperation and 
collaboration in the nascent stages of development. In this way all stakeholders can 
have a role and a stake in the way that regulation develops. This may take the form 
of overt self-imposed industry codes of practice or conduct from the participants,254 
and involve less intrusive and direct guidance from public regulators – what might 
be termed a nudge.  
V. STRATEGIES TO REGULATE AI 
In Part IV we outlined a number of theories of regulation and detailed some of 
their deficiencies when it comes to regulating AI. We also outlined some theories 
of regulation that may not be applicable to regulating AI. In this Part, we argue 
that, in the lag time it takes to properly devise an appropriate regulatory structure to 
address AI, public regulatory bodies should begin to exert their influence on the 
nascent development of AI so as to broadly guide its development in beneficial 
ways. We then suggest that public regulators should begin to develop risk-based 
strategies to most effectively target their limited regulatory resources. Regulating 
the risk profile for AI outlined in Part III requires a staggered approach where the 
highest risks, as assessed by public regulators, are addressed first. At the very least, 
regulators should be taking steps now to establish what risks pertain to what class 
and type of AI and be in a position to regulate if eventually required. However, as 
governments have so far shown an inability to engage with regulation in this area, 
we suggest that there is a broader and more immediate role for the state in 
influencing the development of AI systems, but that doing so well will require 
some innovation in regulatory practices. We suggest that this can be done 
immediately while the harder and more onerous task of preparing risk profiles can 
happen over a longer term. The recent Stanford Report recommended a ‘vigorous 
and informed debate’ to ‘steer AI in ways that enrich our lives and our society’.255 
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How government regulators may actually be able to steer AI development, 
however, is a crucial and, as yet, unanswered question. In this Part, we consider 
how public regulatory agencies may be able to adopt strategies to ‘nudge’256 the 
development of AI. In this way, regulators may be able to influence those 
responsible for designing and deploying AI systems to do so in a way that furthers 
the public interest. 
A. The Influence of Regulators, or Nudging 
Much has been made of nudge theory in recent years.257 Psychological 
observations as applied in behavioural economics reveal that normative human 
behavior can be skewed or distorted by inherent human biases. Nudge theory 
proposes that by exploiting these biases, human behavior can be nudged to behave 
in a way so as to achieve an outcome desired by the nudger. The theory has tended 
to focus on nudging individual behaviours. However, there has been some recent 
work on how behavioural economics approaches might influence a broader 
spectrum of decision-makers.258 In an example used in a study of environmental 
policy-making, Weber argued that ‘decisions could be reframed in ways that might 
affect choices by changing the focus of such decisions from individuals to 
groups’.259 She argued that ‘cultures that emphasize the importance of affiliation 
and social goals over autonomy and individual goals have been shown to influence 
the way in which decisions under risk and uncertainty get made’.260 Weber argued 
further that ‘the goal of environmental policy is to change the behaviour of 
companies, governing boards and committees, and members of the general public 
in the direction of more sustainable, long-term, and socially and environmentally 
responsible actions.’261 Weber concluded that ‘conventional policy interventions are 
not using the full range of goals that motivate behaviour and changes in behaviour 
… [and] do not utilize the full range of processes that people use to decide on a 
course of action.’262 These regulatory interventions apply the idea of nudging in its 
broadest sense. It is not only the behavior of the individual that can be the target of 
behavioural policy-making. The theory can be used to influence those who govern 
companies such as boards of directors. In this way regulatory policy can shape the 
behaviours of companies and, even more broadly, groups of companies within 
industries. 
In Weber’s example, policies are directed to influence the environmental 
responsibility of companies. We argue that similar broad policies directed at 
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companies developing AI would begin to influence or guide beneficial behaviours 
in those companies. If governments are unable yet to fully participate in gathering 
information because of resource constraints or because of the diffuse nature of AI 
development, it can begin to shape the behavioural environment by proposing 
policy statements that foster beneficial and benign development of AI. This 
approach has several immediate benefits for public regulators. It is relatively 
inexpensive; it does not require a great deal of investment to be able to set broad 
policy indicators that outline the regulators’ attitude to AI development. It also 
would buy the regulator time to take on the task of fully engaging with the 
regulatory environment as outlined in this paper. 
B. Examples of Influence as Regulation 
The approach of the United States government in attempting to shape 
behaviours of those developing AI is in its infancy. As an early indicator, the 
government has shown that it was, until recently, prepared to consult with groups 
of stakeholders. In 2016 its Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
conducted a series of public workshops held at Washington University, Stanford 
University, Carnegie Mellon University and New York University. The OSTP also 
participated in various industry conferences and sought public comment in the 
form of a Request for Information.263 As a further signal of its policy intention that 
is designed to shape behaviours, the United States government also published two 
documents: a National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic 
Plan, and a National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic 
Plan.264 The Strategic Plan states:  
AI presents some risks in several areas, from jobs and the economy to 
safety, ethical and legal questions. Thus, as AI science and technology 
develops, the federal government must also invest in research to better 
understand what the implications are for AI for all of these rooms, and to 
address these implications by developing AI systems that align with 
ethical, legal and societal goals.265  
The Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence report made 23 
recommendations on what government agencies, schools and universities, and AI 
professionals could do to prepare for the future of AI. This document on its own 
had the effect of engaging with and shaping or influencing the development of AI. 
Evidence for the immediate impact that the report had includes that it was adopted 
by Partnership on AI. 
These strategies might be seen in a number of different ways. Firstly, the 
government is seen to be consultative and is attempting to engage with 
stakeholders in the area. Abbott noted that ‘modern regulatory policy, including 
risk regulation policy, views public communication, input and participation as 
essential’. He cited the 2012 OECD recommendations on regulatory policy that 
                                                     
263 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 40 at 12. 
264 NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL AND NETWORKING AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 
219. Again, this report no longer appears in searches on the whitehouse.gov website. 
265 Id.. Again, this report no longer appears in searches on the whitehouse.gov website. 
 Nudging Robots 54 
 
 
‘call for “open government”, including transparency and communication, 
stakeholder engagement throughout the regulatory process and open and balanced 
public consultations’.266 Secondly, it could be seen as an information gathering 
exercise – something that is noted as being a necessary first step in the risk 
regulation literature as well as in behavioural economics theories. Thirdly, the 
government could be seen to be signposting its intention to regulate if necessary.  
The United States government, by engaging with AI and those responsible for 
developing it and publishing its stated intentions, sent a clear signal to all those 
involved in the developing field of AI. It showed that the government was engaged 
in the conversations and was prepared to stake a claim in game. This also may be 
seen as the government seeking to influence or nudging decision makers in the AI 
industry and to shape behaviours within that field. The government’s emphasis on 
beneficial development clearly articulates its intentions and focus and sends a clear 
signal to the entire industry in the United States and more broadly in the western 
world. Because many of the companies that develop AI are based in the United 
States, such a clear policy signal from the United States government would 
obviously have an influential effect on the behaviours of the major AI companies 
and the people who work within them. 
However, in a worrying development, the United States Government appears 
to have retreated from its laudable approach to participate in the development of 
AI. The Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence report has been removed 
from the government website and archived. Similarly, the government’s National 
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan267 is no longer 
available online and is presumably no longer government policy. Retreating from 
its former position sends an altogether different and equally strong message: that 
regulation is not a priority, is not going to happen in the near future, and the 
government is uninterested in the development of AI, at least for now. If AI is to be 
regulated in any meaningful way then, it may well, in the absence of government 
direction, be up to those developing the AI to control its development. However, 
this is hardly the ideal solution. It is unfortunate that the planned policy no longer 
can have the influential effect that it once had. 
While the United States government has retreated from its role as influencing 
the development of AI, the European Parliament has taken positive steps. In 
February 2017 it passed a resolution to recommend to the European Union 
Commission to develop Civil Law Rules on Robotics (and included AI).268 The 
resolution recommends that the EU adopt rules on liability for issues arising from 
robots and AI,269 and also recommends that the EC designate a European Agency 
for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence to govern robotics and AI. The Agency 
would: 
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provide the technical, ethical and regulatory expertise needed to support 
the relevant public actors, at both Union and Member State level, in their 
efforts to ensure a timely, ethical and well-informed response to the new 
opportunities and challenges, in particular those of a cross-border nature, 
arising from technological developments in robotics, such as in the 
transport sector.270 
The resolution recommends a system of registration of so-called ‘smart 
robots’, the definition of which is wide enough to capture AI. The registration 
would apply across EU.271 The resolution also recommends developing a Code of 
Ethical Conduct for researchers and designers in robotics and AI to ‘act responsibly 
and with absolute consideration for the need to respect the dignity, privacy and 
safety of humans.’272 This move by the European Parliament and Commission 
sends a clear signal to the industry intended to influence the research, development 
and design of robots and AI, at least in Europe. Once set up, the Agency for 
Robotics and Artificial Intelligence will begin to gather the technical, ethical and 
regulatory expertise so needed to begin the regulatory process. This initiative 
represents the most advanced work towards regulation of AI today and should be 
lauded as a model for the rest of the world. 
There is therefore a place for government policy to shape the behavior of 
those in the AI industry. At the same time though, more needs to be done to begin 
the process of developing regulation. As discussed in Part IV, we propose that a 
Really Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulatory framework will be most 
effective. The risk based regulatory approach will allow regulatory bodies to target 
their intervention to the most pressing elements of AI development based upon a 
risk analysis. 
C. Risk-based Regulation of AI 
In Parts III and IV we outlined a number of risk profiles for various classes of 
AI. Given the risks posed by AI, it is appropriate that regulation responds to those 
risks. Risk based frameworks usually entail the following sequence: firstly the 
regulator sets the level and type of risks it will tolerate; secondly the regulator 
conducts some form of risk assessment and assesses the likelihood of the risk 
eventuating; thirdly, regulators will evaluate the risk and rank the regulated entities 
on their level of risk – high, medium or low and fourthly, will allocate resources 
according to the level of risk that they have assessed.273 These tasks are usually 
carried out by a regulatory agency after consultation with those within the industry.  
In the regulation of AI then, public regulators must undertake a risk analysis 
of current applications of AI. After the regulator has assessed and set the level of 
risk that it might tolerate, it must gather as much information about the state of 
affairs as is possible. This can be done by consulting with those already in the 
industry and participating in or organising information sessions such as roundtables 
that involve all relevant stakeholders. The risks can only be properly assessed with 
all relevant information. Only when public regulatory agencies or governments are 
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aware of the issues will they be in a position to properly rank the risks that meet or 
exceed their tolerance levels and to allocate the necessary resources to regulate the 
risks involved. Our initial triage of risks posed by various applications of AI in Part 
III could then be refined and further developed in a feedback loop after multiple 
consultation processes. 
Van Asselt and Ren emphasised the need for communication and inclusion 
when assessing risk. They argued that ‘various actors are included, [and] play a key 
role in framing the risk’. This inclusion includes ‘roundtables, open forums, 
negotiated rule-making exercises, mediation, or mixed advisory committees, 
including scientists and stakeholders.’274 They emphasised that ‘it is important to 
know what the various actors label as risk problems. In that view, inclusion is a 
means to an end: integration of all relevant knowledge and inclusion of all relevant 
concerns’.275 The participants, they argue, should include ‘a range of actors which 
have complementary roles and diverging interests’.276 Hutter also noted that to 
achieve regulatory excellence, ‘regulators must have access to accurate information 
so that they have a clear idea of the risks they are regulating’.277 As outlined in Part 
IV, relevant industry parties are forming industry level associations and groups to 
share information and agree on principles and shared values. As discussed, this has 
already resulted in a range of principles and proposed standards by which many in 
the industry have agreed to be bound. However, government and regulatory bodies 
must now engage in the process. The United States government in particular, up 
until recently, had shown that it was willing to take the lead in this information 
gathering and sharing phase of the regulatory process. It is essential for the 
government to continue this level of involvement if it is to put itself in a position to 
be able to regulate effectively. Without such involvement, it will continue to have 
little influence on the direction that AI development takes. At the same time, 
regulatory bodies need to begin to assess and rank the various risks associated with 
AI applications. 
D. Classifying the Risks 
The high costs of, and challenges to, effective regulatory intervention requires 
that the attention of regulators should be carefully focused on the areas posing 
greatest risk. We argued in Part III that different claims to AI can be refined into at 
the very least three broad subcategories based upon whether it is (a) narrow and 
single use AI, (b) it displays some characteristics of operating autonomously or 
may pursue its own goals, or (c) are or display some of the characteristics of AGI. 
Each of these classes poses different risks and those risks vary within classes 
depending on the application. Within each category there are many sub-categories 
of application. Relatively benign applications of AI such as in Roomba, Pandora or 
simple game applications can be placed within the low risk category. On the next 
level, we include more robust applications such as the AI in AlphaGo, the more 
experimental aspects of AI work carried out by Google, Facebook Microsoft, 
Apple, Amazon, and any other large player experimenting with AI as referred to in 
Part II above. The third class includes the more concerning aspects associated with 
                                                     
274 van Asselt and Renn, supra note 133 at 440. 
275 Id. at 441. 
276 Id. at 441. 
277 Hutter, supra note 128 at 104. 
 Nudging Robots 57 
 
 
experiments seeking to attain AGI. This group would include research conducted 
by mathematicians and engineers who seek to create either a self-replicating AI or 
AGI without concern or knowledge aforethought for its ultimate capabilities.278 The 
problem with regulating AI identified in Part II is that each of these applications 
could plausibly lay claim to being, applying or using AI. However, each category 
does not and cannot justify or require the same regulatory response, and some 
applications may not even require a regulatory response at this stage.279 It is only 
when the risk profile of an AI application increases that a regulatory response may 
be required. For example, more and less risky applications of AI will exist within a 
single class of AI (for example, narrow AI). However, without a risk analysis, the 
level of risk of each application within a class is as yet unascertained.  
The class of AI that poses the greatest risk to humanity as a systemic risk is 
AGI. We discuss AGI even though it does not currently exist because it requires an 
immediate regulatory response, if indeed it is not already too late to regulate its 
research and development. AI professionals are already experimenting with self-
replication and AI autonomy. While these experiments do not yet reach the level of 
AGI, they remain a very high potential and perhaps imminent risk. If one of these 
experiments, through accident or serendipity, creates a form of AGI, then the 
concerns expressed by many in the industry become reality and the chance to 
control its behaviour may well be lost. Lethal autonomous weapons also pose an 
extremely high risk to human wellbeing but this sub-category of AI application is 
subject to its own unique regulatory environment and is outside the scope of this 
paper.280 
A further complication in regulating AI using a risk-based strategy arises 
because none of the risks or classes of AI is static. The level of risk posed by 
applications within in classes may increase or decrease. Various push and pull 
factors will move the applications in each class up and down depending on features 
that either ameliorate or accentuate the risks associated with its use. The risks 
posed by narrow applications may become stronger and hence may ultimately 
become AGI. The question for regulators is at what point they should intervene. 
Should they begin to regulate as soon as AI poses some risk or should they wait 
until an imminent risk is apparent? A further complication is that, at this stage, 
relevant regulators are not even in a position to discern which application of AI fits 
within which class. No clear system of classification currently exists. Our 
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suggestion is to begin classifying based on the level of risk each application 
currently poses. 
Yet a further complication arises because the same public regulator or 
regulatory agency will not regulate all (or even more than one) of the applications 
within each class. The classes we have identified are separated broadly by risk 
factors and not by application type. So, even though they may be on the same class 
and the same level of risk for the purposes of our classification, the regulators who 
might respond to concerns raised by the use of AI in autonomous vehicles will not 
be required to consider Google’s use of AI to reduce electricity consumption in its 
data centres for example.  
We suggest that it is the role of governments and regulatory bodies to begin to 
influence the direction that AI is to take at a broad level and to attempt to intercede 
now in its development. We have provided suggestions on the role of public 
regulators as to how this might be done. In the meantime, our initial proposal is for 
governments or public regulators to take steps towards regulating AI by obtaining 
information, joining and commencing conversations with stakeholders in the 
industries that use AI, and influencing the development of AI in ways beneficial to 
society. We contend that the most dangerous (and as yet unattained) class of AI, 
AGI, should be regulated now and serious questions about its development should 
be considered and discussed among AI professionals now. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
On 21 May 1946, as scientists were still experimenting with the new power of 
nuclear energy, Louis Slotin, a Canadian physicist who had worked on the 
Manhattan project to develop nuclear weapons during World War II, was preparing 
to conduct an experiment in a lab in the New Mexico desert. Slotin was slowly 
lowering a hemispherical beryllium tamper over a piece of plutonium to excite the 
neutrons that were emitting from the plutonium core. This process would create a 
small nuclear reaction so that the scientists could measure the results. The process 
was aptly referred to as ‘tickling the dragon’s tail’. On 21 May, Slotin slipped and 
dropped the beryllium tamper directly onto the core causing a momentary but 
powerful reaction that irradiated the whole room. Slotin bore the brunt of the 
reaction. He died a painful death nine days later from radiation poisoning.281 
Seventy years later, scientists, engineers and technicians are experimenting 
with a new scientific development with potentially destructive capabilities. If we 
are to heed the allegory in the golem stories or the metaphor of the dragon’s tail, 
we must come to the conclusion that any such danger, no matter its potential, 
should be carefully handled. We do not suggest a draconian, command and control 
type of regulation, and do not even think it would work. However, we do suggest a 
new and more nuanced, responsive, and adaptive regulation developed to foster 
innovation and minimise the risks of AI. This approach, as with the approach in 
relation to the treatment of nuclear weapons, needs a global solution and will not 
be easy. 
                                                     
281 See Alex Wellerstein, THE DEMON CORE AND THE STRANGE DEATH OF LOUIS SLOTIN 
THE NEW YORKER (2016), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/demon-core-the-
strange-death-of-louis-slotin (last visited Jul 27, 2017). 
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In the last two decades, the face of technology, the institutions involved, and 
therefore the AI regulatory space has changed dramatically. This period has seen 
the rise of some of the biggest technology companies including Microsoft, Apple, 
Facebook and Google as major leaders in AI. It is arguable that in terms of new 
technology development, including AI, these companies hold the lion’s share of 
regulatory resources.282 Public regulators, by contrast, appear to be increasingly in 
the difficult position of needing to find mechanisms to regulate technology they 
have only limited capabilities to understand by influencing firms that are very well 
resourced and connected and can exercise substantial choice about the jurisdictions 
in which they operate.  
There are encouraging signs from recent publications – certainly the emphasis 
on more research to pay attention to the social impacts of AI from both the United 
States government and from private coalitions is encouraging. Still, the rhetoric of 
avoiding over-regulation is worrying – even the biggest and most well-resourced 
government regulators are hesitant and probably will not be particularly well 
equipped to deal with this any time soon. For smaller regulators – including those 
outside of the United States, there is almost no chance of successfully intervening 
in current technological development. Governments are left to try to influence or 
nudge the development of AI at the broad policy level. This remains one of the 
only roles that might remain available to government given the changing power 
dynamics between government and these large companies. 
There are benefits to self-regulation, particularly where public regulators lack 
the requisite knowledge to understand the problem that needs regulating. Self-
regulation has in its favour that it involves iterative and cooperative development 
of standards with input from various stakeholders at the coalface of the problem. 
The downside to self-regulation is that it works best where there is some imminent 
threat of state-based penalty for non-compliance. As discussed, governments are at 
a disadvantage, probably for the first time in history at this scale, against the major 
corporate stakeholders in AI. 
The United States government is perhaps best able to shape the development 
of AI because many of the major AI companies are based in the United States. 
Recent studies in behavioural policy making suggest that the attitudinal settings of 
people within groups shape the development of the group. The government 
recently set about the task of informing itself about AI and has set out both a 
strategic and a research and development policy that seeks to influence beneficial 
development of AI. By setting out its agenda as it has and by investing in 
collaboration with industry participants, the United States Government had set a 
positive benchmark that sought to sway participants in the field. Whether this can 
be called nudging or not is moot, but the intention was clear. However, the 
government has more recently retreated from this stance; this is regrettable. The 
latest retrograde steps send an equal and opposite message to AI developers. In a 
positive sign though, the European Union has taken positive steps toward 
regulation of robots and AI and other countries might do well to replicate its 
example.  
Because regulators do not yet have the expertise or even enough information 
to create expertise, if we are ever to ensure AI is developed in a way that is 
                                                     
282 HOOD AND MARGETTS, supra note 197 (discussing resources of nodality, authority, 
treasure, and organisation). 
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beneficial for humanity, developers must acknowledge both their social obligation 
to share information (be transparent and accountable) with others, and critical 
importance of collaborations with thinkers from other disciplines. The ethics board 
set up by DeepMind and Google, and the Partnership on AI are great examples of 
this. However, the problems that face potential regulators attempting to regulate 
such a dynamic field illustrate that more collaboration and information sharing 
between all relevant parties is required if we are to safely reap the benefits of AI.  
The risks that different classes of AI pose lie along a spectrum. Similarly, the 
different applications of AI pose different and variable risks within the field in 
which they are applied. Public regulators must begin to engage with researchers 
and professionals in the area to gain the necessary information required to be able 
to identify and regulate in relation to the greatest risks that AI poses. By adopting a 
risk-based approach, public regulators will be able to target their approaches to 
achieve the most efficient and effective regulatory outcomes. 
